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I. Introduction
As death and injury tolls increase, concern over "drunk driving"'
has become nationwide. Citizen groups have been formed,2 federal leg-
islation passed, 3 a presidential commission appointed,4 and new law en-
forcement techniques implemented to reduce the number of drunk driv-
ers.5 Florida's situation reflects the national picture. During 1980,
1. As used herein "drunk driving" includes driving under the influence, driving
with unlawful blood alcohol level and driving while intoxicated. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration claims drinking occurs in at least 40-55% of all fatal car
accidents. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 52 (1981).
2. The largest national organization is MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driv-
ing), with eighty-three chapters in twenty-nine states. See Starr, The War Against
Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34.
3. See Alcohol Traffic Safety - National Driver Register Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-364, 96 Stat. 1738 (1982) which provides incentive grants to those states adopt-
ing specified sanctions for drunk driving offenses and establishes a National Driver
Register to help states exchange information about individual driving records. See S.
REP. No. 360, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H. REP. No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3367-76.
4. On June 4, 1982 a thirty member commission, headed by former Secretary of
Transportation John Volpe, was formally sworn in and directed to provide national
focus on drunk driving. See Drunken driving panel ready to go to work, Fort Lauder-
dale News and Sun-Sentinel, June 5, 1982, at 7A, col. 1.
5. In Montgomery County, Maryland; police use a "Sobriety Checkpoint" proce-
dure to detect imparied drivers. All drivers are stopped for inspection but only those
smelling of alcohol must perform a "sobriety test" consisting of walking a straight line,
standing on one leg and reciting the alphabet. Between November 1981 and March
1982, this procedure detected over one hundred impaired drivers. The Drunk Blitz, The
Nat'l L.J., March 22, 1982, at 1, col. 2. See also Death on the Road, Wall St. J., Apr.
20, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
The American Civil Liberties Union has questioned the checkpoint's constitution-
ality. However, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), approved rou-
tine Border Patrol stops at permanent checkpoints to search for illegal aliens. The
Court rejected arguments that reasonable suspicion was required, since traffic flow past
the checkpoint would not allow "the particularized study of a given car that would
enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens." Id. at 557. Since the
checkpoints were publicly known and administrative officials fixed the location, the in-
trusion differed from random highway stops based on a particular officer's whim. Re-
ferral to a second inspection place based on Mexican ancestry alone was considered
reasonable. The parallel to sobriety checkpoints is obvious. Traffic past the checkpoint
does not allow time to study all drivers. Likewise, an objective fact, breath smell, deter-
mines who is questioned further.
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drinking was the third highest factor in accidents statewide.' In 1981
there were 48,084 arrests for driving under the influence of either li-
quor or drugs.7 While nationwide traffic fatalities declined in 1981,
Florida's increased.8
Given this situation, the 1982 Florida legislature passed one of the
nation's toughest "drunk driving" laws. 9 Effective July 1, 1982, it aims
at deterring drunk driving by three methods: (1) increasing penalties,
(2) making evidence gathering easier, and (3) making exclusion of evi-
dence harder. While praiseworthy in its goals, the law contains several
provisions of dubious constitutionality and others which create
Officials supporting "sobriety checkpoints" may also rely on Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979), which found stopping automobiles to check for driver licenses
and registrations without probable cause or reasonable suspicion violated the fourth
amendment when individual officers arbitrarily chose the cars. The Court indicated
other methods could satisfy fourth amendment reasonableness standards: "This holding
does not preclude. . . developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncom-
ing traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id. at 663 (emphasis
added). As Maryland procedure requires all drivers to stop, its constitutionality should
be upheld. See United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981) (Roadblock
stopping all west-bound vehicles, except semi-trucks to check licenses and registrations
constitutional; Delaware v. Prouse distinguished.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981),
reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1069 (1981).
6. Drinking existed in 36,986 accidents, nine percent of the statewide total. Six-
teen percent of drivers and/or pedestrians -in fatal accidents had been drinking. DE-
PARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS 6,
15 (1980).
7. This was 10.4 percent of the total statewide arrests, second only to larceny at
14.6 percent. FLA. L. ENFORCEMENT ANN. REP. 109 (1981).
8. During 1981 motor vehicle deaths declined four percent nationwide but, in
Florida, they increased eight percent. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, TRAFFIC
SAFETY MAGAZINE, May-June 1982, at 26.
9. The 1982 legislature actually amended the drunk driving laws twice. See 1982
Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 155, 403 (West). At least five other states recently changed their
laws to provide for harsher penalties and/or stricter enforcement. See CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23151-23229 (Deering Supp. 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , §§ 11.501-11.501.2
(Supp. 1981); 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws. ch. 144, 619; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§
1312-1314 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 205-205.2 (Supp. 1981). For
discussions of Illinois's and California's new laws see Comment, Drunk Drivers versus
Implied Consent: A Sobering New Illinois Statute, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 479 (1982);
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problems of statutory interpretation. This article's purpose is to review
the new law's changes in light of the constitutional and statutory inter-
pretation problems it contains. Since some issues are new in Florida,
reference is made to the case law of other jurisdictions, as well as previ-
ous Florida cases.
II. Statutory Offense Provision and Penalty Changes
A. Statutory Offenses
Former Florida law considered "drunk driving" so serious that
three different criminal violations could occur: (1) driving under the
influence; (2) driving while intoxicated; or (3) driving with unlawful
blood alcohol10 The new law retains these offenses, merely rearranging
and consolidating their statutory placement. Driving under the influ-
ence violates either of two statutory provisions. Florida Statutes section
316.193(1)11 makes it unlawful: "under the influence of alcoholic bev-
erages, model glue, or any substance controlled . . ., to the extent...
normal faculties are impaired,. . . to drive or be in the actual physical
control of any vehicle within this state. ' 12 Florida Statutes section
316.1934(1)13 substantially duplicates this provision, replacing former
Florida Statutes Section 322.262(1).14 However, under section
316.1934(1) controlled substances are also included, while model glue
10. See infra text accompanying notes 12-22.
11. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1) (Supp. 1982).
12. Id. Driving under the influence can be shown several ways. If blood alcohol
content level registers 0.10 percent or more, under Florida Statutes section
316.1934(2)(c) (Supp. 1982) this is prima facie evidence of being under the influence.
State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980) declared this a rebuttable, rather
than conclusive, presumption. Field sobriety tests are often used to bolster the state's
claim. These may be administered without consent, if there is "sufficient cause to be-
lieve" the driver has violated the law. State v. Liefert, 247 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1971). Such tests may be protected by the Florida Accident Report Privilege.
DuVal Motor Co. v. Woodward, 419 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1982).
13. Florida Statutes section 316.1934(1) (Supp. 1982) makes it unlawful "for
any person who is under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances
when affected to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired, to drive or be in the
actual physical control of any motor vehicle within this state." Controlled substances
are enumerated in Florida Statutes section 893.03, schedules I through V.
14. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(1) (1981).
4
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is omitted.
Previous Florida law made driving with blood alcohol content 0.10
or more, illegal under two provisions. The new law retains this dual
prohibition. Former Florida Statutes section 316.193(3)15 has been re-
placed and its prohibition combined with driving under the influence in
present section 316.193(1). Former Florida Statutes section
322.262(2)(c),1 has been renumbered as section 316.1934(2)(c). 17
Under former Florida Statutes section 860.01(1), a person com-
mitted a separate offense when driving "intoxicated or under the influ-
ence" and deprived "of full possession of his normal faculties. .. .
Florida Statutes section 316.1931(1)19 replaces section 860.01(1) and
also prohibits being "in actual physical control of"20 a motor vehicle in
this condition. When property damage or personal injury results from
such condition, the offense is a first degree misdemeanor under both
past and present law.21 If another's death results, the crime becomes
D.W.I. manslaughter under both past and present law. However, for-
mer section 860.01(2) only applied to intoxication"' from alcohol. Thus
15. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3) (1981).
16. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(2)(c) (1981).
17. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c) (Supp. 1982).
18. FLA. STAT. § 860.01(1) (1981).
19. FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(1) (Supp. 1982).
20. "In actual physical control" exists whenever a vehicle can be operated and a
driver is not too intoxicated to do so. See vol. - Op. Att'y Gen. 066-69 (1966).
21. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(2) (Supp. 1982) and former FLA. STAT. §
860.01(2) (1981).
22. Proof of intoxication requires more than just driving under the influence.
"[T]he term, 'intoxicated', is stronger than and includes the terms 'under the influence'
of intoxicating liquor." Taylor v. State, 46 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1950) (citing Cannon
v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, 362 (1925)).
Baker v. State, 377 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1979), rejected the claim that former §
860.01(2), now § 316.1931(2), violated due process, because it did not require causal
connection between intoxication and the resulting death, thus allowing a non-negligent
driver to be found guilty of D.W.I. manslaughter. The court declared only three ele-
ments are needed to show D.W.I. manslaughter, that: "(1) a death occurred; (2) the
death resulted from the operation of a vehicle by the defendant, and (3) the defendant
was intoxicated at the time he operated the vehicle." Baker, 377 So. 2d at 18. The
negligence occurred when the driver began driving while intoxicated and continued un-
til the accident happened. Since driving while intoxicated is per se reckless, the legisla-
ture could rationally conclude imposing criminal sanctions without a showing of causa-
1831Drunk Driving Laws17:1983
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if the intoxication was from glue or controlled substances, D.W.I. man-
slaughter charges were not possible. 3 Present section 316.1931(2) pro-
vides that D.W.I manslaughter charges may be brought even if the in-
toxication occurs from these substances.
B. Penalties
One of the new law's major changes was to increase penalties for
conviction. Former Florida law imposed different penalties for first of-
fenses of driving under the influence and driving with unlawful blood
alcohol.24 No reason for such disparate treatment appeared in the pre-
vious statutory scheme. Under the new law, both violations are equally
punishable.2 5 The new penalty provisions raise the minimum fine for
driving under the influence to two hundred fifty dollars. For a second
conviction there is a minimum fine of five hundred dollars, the previous
maximum for either second offense,26 and a maximum of one thousand
dollars. For a third or subsequent offense a minimum of a one thousand
dollar and a maximum of a two thousand five hundred dollar fine is set,
compared to a previous maximum of one thousand dollars for driving
under the influence and five hundred dollars for driving with unlawful
blood alcohol.27
Like previous law, driving while intoxicated carries the same pun-
ishment as driving under the influence.2 8 When this is a first-degree
tion between driving in such a condition and any death would act as a deterrent.
23. But see State v. Rafferty, 405 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
where manslaughter charges were brought due to intoxication from a controlled
substance.
24. Under former Florida Statutes section 316.193(2)(a) (1981) first offenders
convicted of driving under the influence faced a fine between twenty-five dollars and
five hundred dollars plus possible imprisonment up to six months. Under former Florida
Statutes section 316.193(4)(a) (1981) first offenders for driving with unlawful blood
alcohol faced no minimum and a maximum two hundred-fifty dollar fine, one-half the
possible maximum for driving while impaired. Likewise first offenders with unlawful
blood alcohol could be sentenced to only a maximum ninety days, one-half the possible
maximum for driving while impaired.
25. See FLA.. STAT. § 316.193(2)(a), (b) (Supp. 1982).
26. See former FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(b), 4(c) (1981).
27. See former FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(c), 4(c) (1981).
28. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(1) (Supp. 1982).
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misdemeanor, because of personal injury or property damage, Florida
Statutes section 316.1931(2) continues to impose punishment under the
general penalty provisions of sections 775.082 and 775.083.29 However
no penalty can be less than that imposable under section 316.193. 0
This ensures the mandatory penalty provisions for repeat offenses apply
when a lesser penalty might otherwise be given.
Contrary to popular belief the new "drunk driving" law does not
substantially change imprisonment penalties. First offenses may still
carry no mandatory jail terms.31 Second and third offenses within three
and five years, respectively, are punishable by minimum mandatory
sentences of ten and thirty days respectively.3 2 However, if a driver is
29. Under FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (1981), a first degree misdemeanant may
receive up to one year imprisonment, plus a one thousand dollar ($1,000.00) fine under
FLA. STAT. § 775.083(1)(d) (1981).
30. FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (Supp. 1982).
31. According to public opinion, there is no mandatory imprisonment sentence
for a first offender for any of the three offenses. See Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-
Sentinel; Apr. 25, 1982, at 15A, col. 1. However a strict reading of FLA. STAT. §
316.193 does not support this. Section 316.193 states in part:
(2) Any person who is convicted of a violation ... shall be punished.
(a) By a fine of:
[the various fines for first, second and third offenses are listed.]
and
(b) By imprisonment for:
1. Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.
(emphasis added).
If the legislature wished to use imprisonment to supplement fines for first offenders, the
words "and/or" should have been used. Former section 316.193(2)(a) (1981) clearly
indicated imprisonment for first offenders was not mandatory:
Any person who is convicted of a violation ... shall be punished.
(a) For first conviction thereof, by imprisonment ... or by fine ... or by
both such fine and imprisonment.
(emphasis added.)
If the legislature did not intend mandatory incarceration for first offenders, it
should amend section 316.193(2) next session to clarify this.
32. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(4)(b), (c) (Supp. 1982). This also applies to repeat
first degree misdemeanants under § 316.193(1) (Supp. 1982). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 29-31. Under the new law's enhanced sentencing provisions, prior convic-
tions for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, and/or driving with
unlawful blood alcohol are considered the same offenses. See FLA. STAT. §
316.193(4)(c) (Supp. 1982).
185 1Drunk Driving Laws1 7:1983
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convicted of a second offense more than three years after a first convic-
tion or a third offense more than five years after a first conviction, im-
prisonment is governed by the first offender provisions.
Besides a fine or possible jail term, prior offenders could be re-
quired to attend alcohol education programs and undergo evaluation
and treatment. 83 This is now mandatory for all first-time offenders and
encompasses chemicals other than alcohol.3 ' Considering the legisla-
ture's recognition that chemicals besides alcohol impair driving, this
change is wise.3 5
First offenders must also do fifty hours of "public service" or
"community work project."86 As there is no definition of "public ser-
vice" or "community work project", each county can fashion its own
requirements3 7 in keeping with the differing community needs of Flor-
ida's counties. No public service is required of repeat offenders within
three and five year periods. Evidently the legislature envisioned a sen-
tencing scheme where most first offenders receive the minimum fine,
required education and/or evaluation, and no incarceration unless un-
usual circumstances exist. The community service requirement should
usually be an alternative, and not a supplement, to incarceration for
33. Former Florida Statutes section 316.193(5) (1981) stated in part: "At the
discretion of the court, any person convicted ... may be required to attend an alcohol
education course specified by the court and may be referred to an authorized agency
for alcoholism evaluation and treatment. .. ."
34. See FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3) (Supp. 1982).
35. A Minnesota Department of Public Safety study reports assessment and re-
habilitation may be more effective than increased fines and incarceration. According to
the study, "Convicted drunk drivers who went through an assessment and rehabilita-
tion were only half as likely to be re-arrested for drunk driving as those who had no
assessment and received the conventional penalties of a fine and/or jail sentence." NA-
TIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, TRAFFIC SAFETY MAGAZINE, Aug. 1979, at 19.
36. See FLA. STAT. § 316.193(4)(a) (Supp. 1982).
37. How widely counties may define this is shown in recent newspaper articles.
In Palm Beach County, offenders donating one pint of blood receive credit for eight
hours of work. See Patrol Targets Drunk Drivers, Miami Herald, June 13, 1982, at
6B, col. 1. Broward County created a Community Service Program to oversee the re-
quirement. Counselors examine an offender's background and work schedules before
making a public service assignment. Assignments cover a broad range of menial activi-
ties. The new Program monitors an offender's hours to make sure the full requirement
is met. See Civic Jobs Lined Up for Drunk Motorists, Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-
Sentinel, Aug. 8, 1982, at lIB, col. 1.
1186 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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first offenders.38 Since second and third offenders receive mandatory
jail terms, the legislature apparently felt an added community service
requirement would have no appreciable effect.
Statutory provisions requiring suspension or revocation of a
driver's license for any "drunk driving" offense remain basically un-
changed.39 Like the penalty provisions, the suspension term has been
lengthened and standardized.4 0 Limited privileges for necessary busi-
ness uses can be obtained if a convicted driver successfully completes
the required substance abuse education. 1 Since the course's aim is to
rehabilitate and educate problem drivers, this provision will provide in-
centive to complete such training promptly. However, any driver twice
convicted of a "drunk driving" offense or whose license has been twice
suspended for refusal to comply with the implied consent law's testing
provisions42 is ineligible for limited driving privileges.
38. State legislators commenting on the new law called this a compromise be-
tween mandatory sentencing for first offenders and previous sentencing provisions. Fear
a mandatory first time sentence would further strain Florida's overcrowded jails led to
the compromise. See Drunk Driving Law May Stagger, Fort Lauderdale News, Apr.
21, 1982, at lB, col. 2. Even without mandatory sentencing for first time offenders, the
new law has strained Florida's court system. After six months experience, jury trials in
drunk driving cases have increased by 25% and guilty pleas have dropped by 12%. See
Courts feel impact of new drunk driving law, Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel,
Jan. 23, 1983, at IB, col. 5.
Florida is not alone in requiring community service. The new Kansas law requires
either a minimum forty-eight hours incarceration or 100 hours public service. 1982
Kan. Sess. Laws. ch. 144, § 5, 624.
39. Florida Statutes section 322.28(2) (Supp. 1982) requires suspension or revo-
cation for any of the three offenses. Former Section 322.28(2) (1981) applied only to
driving under the influence of alcohol. Present Florida Statutes section 322.28(2) ap-
plies to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances.
40. Florida Statutes section 322.28(2)(a) (Supp. 1982) provides a minimum sus-
pension period of 180 days to one year for first conviction of driving with unlawful
blood alcohol or driving under the influence. Former section 322.28(2)(a) (1981) pro-
vided different suspension periods for these two offenses: 30 to 90 days for unlawful
blood alcohol and 90 days to one year for being under the influence. Thus the new bill
again expresses the legislature's intent to treat these two offenses similarly.
Revocation periods for second and third convictions within five and ten years of a
prior conviction have been substantially increased from six months to five years for
second offenses, and from five years to ten years for third offenses.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 322.271(2) (Supp. 1982).
42. For discussion of the Implied Consent Law's required test submission pro-
1871
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The new law makes it harder for drivers whose licenses have been
suspended or revoked to regain their driving privileges and impossible
to do so after a certain point. When privileges are revoked, a driver
must retake the examination after revocation expires . 3 Before re-test-
ing, the driver must prove he has completed any required driver train-
ing or substance abuse courses. 4 However no driver's license can be re-
issued to anyone convicted of four "drunk driving" offenses.45 This pro-
vision is appropriate since after three unsuccessful attempts to rehabili-
tate a driver through a combination of education, fines and imprison-
ment, any further attempts will most likely be futile. Unlike provisions
relating to fines and penalties," this prohibition has no applicable time
period. Thus four offenses alone, no matter how far apart, will cause
permanent loss of license.
III. Miscellaneous Statutory Changes
The new law initially made six other major changes: (1) provisions
for urinalysis, (2) provisions for non-forcible blood testing, (3) provi-
sions to increase the admissibility of chemical intoxication test results,
(4) provisions modifying the Accident Report Privilege, (5) provisions
admitting refusals of mandatory testing, and (6) provisions for limited
forcible blood testing. With the exception of the provisions modifying
the Accident Report Privilege, all represent changes in the Florida Im-
plied Consent Law which requires drivers to agree to chemical testing
in return for driving privileges. However, as described below, the
changes in provisions for non-forcible blood testing were subsequently
amended to conform to prior law. Since the last change raises constitu-
tional questions, it is discussed in the next section. The others are ex-
amined below.
grams see infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
43. See FLA. STAT. § 322.28(2)(d) (Supp. 1982).
44. Id. Like the new requirements for limited driving privileges, this should en-
courage convicted drivers to complete these quickly.
45. FLA. STAT. § 322.28(2)() (Supp. 1982). This prohibition also applies to any
driver convicted of vehicular manslaughter and one other "drunk driving" offense.
However at least one of the four convictions must have occurred after July 1, 1982.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
1 188 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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A. Urinalysis Provisions
Under the former Implied Consent Law 7 drivers only consented to
blood alcohol content tests. When tests were used to determine the
presence of controlled substances, courts split on the admissibility of
the results. In State v. DeMoya,.8 the driver took a requested blood test
but objected when results were used to show methaqualone. The Third
District Court of Appeal suppressed the results, strictly construing the
Implied Consent Law as limited to tests for alcohol. However in State
v. Rafferty,49 after breath tests showed no alcohol, a driver initially
consented to both blood and urine testing showing methaqualone but
later claimed his consent was invalid as he was not in full control of his
faculties. Disregarding this argument, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal decided only probable cause was needed citing Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia.50 Since the Implied Consent law only forbade non-consensual
blood testing for alcohol, urine testing for controlled substances was
governed by pre-law standards.5 1
The new law eliminates this conflict. Florida Statutes section
316.1932(1)(a) 52 extends the implied consent provisions to both breath
testing for alcohol and urine testing for controlled substances. Testing
is permissible at any "detention facility or any other facility mobile or
otherwise. . . equipped to administer such tests in a reasonable man-
ner. . . .",3 Breath and/or urine testing can be done if "reasonable
47. Formerly FLA. STAT. §§ 322.261-322.262 (1981), now §§ 316.1932-316.1934
(Supp. 1982).
48. 380 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
49. 405 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
50. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
51. The result might have been different if only blood sampling for controlled
substances had been done. The former Implied Consent Law could have intended to
limit blood sampling to alcohol detection alone. Since urinalysis was also done, it was
not necessary for the Fourth District Court of Appeal to reach this issue.
DeMoya's result might have been different had the state relied on Schmerber.
Since this was not done, the Third District Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to
confront such an issue. DeMoya, 380 So. 2d at 506.
52. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a) (Supp. 1982).
53. Id. This contemplates use of "BAT" Mobiles, previously used by several
counties for urinalysis and breath testing. See S. Gordon, "BATMOBILE": An Experi-
ence Paper Based on 100-hour Internship (1980) (unpublished M.S. Criminal Justice
thesis) (Available in Nova University Library), reporting that in January, 1980, seven
1891Drunk Driving Laws7:1983
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cause" exists that a driver is under the influence. One type of testing
does not preclude the other, but the question arises whether the same
facts can supply "reasonable cause" for both tests. If so, police will
routinely administer both once a driver is lawfully arrested. One source
reports urinalysis is often done after breath tests fail to show blood
alcohol content above the statutorily presumed level of "under the in-
fluence." Indeed Rafferty noted "the zero readings yielded by the
breathalyzer tests" 55 as one factor police could use to conclude the
driver was probably under the influence of drugs.
Another question is the proper testing methods for urinalysis. Un-
like breath and blood testing, the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services has not been given responsibility to establish urine test-
ing procedures.5" Arguably, each county could establish separate
procedures as long as the courts consider them accurate. Prior Florida
case law on scientific testing is among the most liberal in the United
States. Many states allow testimony concerning a scientific process only
if it has "such standing and scientific recognition among . . . authori-
ties as would justify the courts in admitting the expert testimony de-
clared from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far
made. ' 57 However, in Coppolino v. State,58 Florida adopted a liberal
standard for admitting scientific testimony: whether "the tests in ques-
tion were sufficiently reliable to justify their admission."5 9
out of eight urinalysis specimens for drivers who registered a .00% breathalyzer reading
showed methaqualone. Methaqualone is listed as a controlled substance in Florida
Statutes section 893.03(2), Schedule II.
54. Gordon, supra note 53, at 8-14.
55. 405 So. 2d at 1004.
56. Florida Statutes section 316.1932(2)(a) (Supp. 1982) authorizes the Depart-
ment to approve "tests determining the weight of alcohol"; section 316.1933 (Supp.
1982) authorizes the Department "to approve satisfactory techniques or methods" for
determining alcoholic content of blood and section 316.1934(3) (Supp. 1982) provides
that blood or breath tests to be considered valid must be performed by "methods ap-
proved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services." There is no mention
of authority to approve urine testing methods.
57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), disapproving use
of the systolic blood pressure deception test, a precursor of the polygraph.
58. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d
120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
59. Id. at 71. Coppolino concerned admission of chemical testing for suc-
cinylcholine chloride in the body. Before Coppolino, experts believed this was impossi-
12
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In counties where urine testing has not yet gained judicial accept-
ance,60 either test requires expert testimony about the reliability of the
ble to determine. However, two experts testified they had devised a method whereby
determination was possible. Relying on their testimony, the results were admitted and
the defendant found guilty of second degree murder. For different views of Coppolino,
see F. BAILEY, THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS 227-79 (1971); M. HELPERN, AUTOPSY 16-
45 (1977).
Since the method used had not gained recognition among the scientific community
- a pre-requisite under Frye - several writers argue Coppolino rejected Frye in favor
of a lower "relevancy" standard:
'General scientific acceptance' is a proper condition for taking judicial no-
tice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified ex-
pert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.
Particularly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of
prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time. If the
courts used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed 'requirement of
general acceptance' not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a practi-
cal way of utilizing the results of scientific advances.
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 491 (Cleary ed. 1972). See also Gianelli, The Admissibil-
ity of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). Gianelli criticizes both standards and urges requiring
the state in a criminal case to establish a new scientific technique's reliability beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Gianelli also criticizes the Coppolino standard for appellate review: "[the judge's]
ruling on admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is
shown." Coppolino, 223 So. 2d at 70. He claims this confuses the judge's traditional
discretion in accepting an expert's qualification with the acceptance of a new scientific
process:
The answer to the question about the reliability of a scientific technique or
process does not vary according to the circumstances of each case. It is
therefore inappropriate to view this threshold question of reliability as a
matter within each trial judge's individual discretion.
Gianelli, supra note 59, at 1223 (citing Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d
364, 367 (1978) (voiceprint analysis inadmissible as not having achieved general ac-
ceptance in the scientific community.)) Gianelli claims the abuse of discretion standard
makes a judge's decision to submit or exclude scientific evidence practially non-revers-
ible. Following Coppolino, Florida appellate courts have never reversed for admission
or exclusion of scientific evidence. See infra cases cited in note 61.
60. Neither DeMoya nor Rafferty addressed the particular method of testing's
reliability. DeMoya only concerned blood testing for controlled substances, thus the
particular method used there is not helpful.
Under the new law, Broward County will use a three level extraction procedure to
7:1983 191 1Drunk Driving Laws
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urine testing used."1 After a method's reliability has once been estab-
lished, judicial notice could be used subsequently. 2 Absent either
method of proof, evidence of urinalysis is inadmissible. The Legislature
should have delegated responsibility to the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services to determine proper urine testing procedure.
Only experience will determine whether the Legislature has created a
problem by not doing so.
test urine. The first level is thin line chromatography; the second is the E.M.I.T. assay
test for cocaine and benzodiazepines; the third level occurs subsequent to a positive
second level test and is thin line chromatography confirmed by ultra-violent spec-
trophometery. Dade County plans to use only gas chromatography. Telephone inter-
view with Gene DeTuscan, Toxicologist, Broward County Medical Examiner's Office
(July 6, 1982.)
61. After Coppolino, Florida courts have never mentioned Frye and adhere to
the more liberal standard. See Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (admitting voiceprint, "Florida courts have long enjoyed considerable dis-
cretion in the admittance of novel or experimental evidence, if they feel certain stan-
dards of scientific reliability have been attained."); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903,
904 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (no error to exclude defendant's statements made
under hypnosis because the "court remains unconvinced of the reliability of statements
procured by way of hypnosis"); Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (no error to exclude psychological testimony); Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d
1024, 1029 (Fla. 1981) (admission of microanalysis showing unknown hair samples
"highly likely" those of defendant depends upon "whether scientific tests are so unrelia-
ble and scientifically unacceptable that admission [is] error.")
For a detailed discussion of Worley v. State, admitting voiceprints see Comment,
Criminal Law: Voiceprint Evidence is Being Heard, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 608 (1973);
Comment, Criminal Law - Evidellce - Voiceprints Admissible to Corroborate Testi-
mony Identifying Accused As One Who Had Made False Bomb Threats By Tele-
phone.-Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972), 1 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 349 (1973).
62. Judicial notice may take three separate forms: (1) Notice of prior decisions
recognizing a method as reliable or unreliable, See Reed, 391 A.2d at 372-76 (1978);
State v. Primm, 4 Kan. App. 2d 314, 606 P.2d 112 (1980) (judicial notice of general
reliability of radar to measure speed); Jent, 408 So. 2d 1024 (judicially noticing earlier
decision in Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964
(1981) which admitted microanalysis). Under Florida Statutes section 90.201 judicial
notice would be required of previous controlling decisions concerning a method; (2)
Notice of the scientific literature in the area, see Reed, 391 A.2d 367; (3) Notice of
expert testimony in prior opinions, see Gianelli supra note 59, at 1218-19 for a brief
critique of all three methods. For detailed discussion of judicial notice in Florida see C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE §§ 90.201-207 (1977).
192 Nova Law Journal
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B. Non-forcible Blood Testing Provisions
Former Florida Statutes section 322.261(c)63 allowed blood sam-
pling when a driver could not take a breath test because of a mental or
physical condition. Consent was implied and could not be withdrawn
later. Any blood test taken either without a driver's consent or pursu-
ant to section 322.261(2)(c) was inadmissible. Generally if no consent
was given, the driver had to be unconscious. However, if serious enough
physical injuries existed, and a driver was hospitalized, section 322.261
allowed blood sampling, since the driver was considered "so incapaci-
tated as to render impractical or impossible the administration"6 4 of
the breath test. 5
Present Florida Statute section 316.1932(2)(c) retains these re-
quirements. As originally amended, a driver had to be "advised as soon
as practicable of such blood withdrawal and the intended use thereof"6
and given the opportunity to withdraw his consent. This provision
would have given drivers more rights than they previously had to ex-
clude evidence, and placed them in an "all win-no, loss" situation.67
This modification clearly was not constitutionally required. In
Breithaupt v. Abram 8 an unconscious driver objected to the use of his
blood sample, but the Supreme Court found no constitutional obstacles.
Likewise, Filmon v. State69 rejected an argument that allowing con-
63. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(2)(c) (1981).
64. Id.
65. State v. Bierbaum, 46 Fla. Supp. 163 (Palm Beach County 1977), which
held the state must show a driver's condition mde requesting a breath test useless.
Being at a hospital was insufficient. However, since there the driver was facially bleed-
ing, complaining of pain and receiving emergency treatment, the showing was met.
Likewise any blood test performed must be done "upon request of a law enforcement
officer. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(2)(c) (Supp. 1982). See Campbell v. State, 423
So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), declaring inadmissible results of hospital
blood tests performed to administer medical treatment and not at police officer's
request.
66. See 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 155, § 3(West).
67. If blood tests register low blood alcohol content few drivers would withdraw
consent. If the test showed a high blood alcohol level, most would withdraw consent
and accept the consequences.
68. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
69. 336 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1976), cert. dismissed sub nom. Filmon v. Florida, 430
U.S. 980 (1980). The original Implied Consent Law was criticized for not giving
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scious drivers to withhold consent but not permitting unconscious or
incapacitated drivers to later do so violated equal protection.
Fortunately the legislature subsequently deleted this provision."0
Thus unconscious or incapacitated drivers still cannot withdraw their
consent to blood samples and exclude the test results.
C. General Provisions Concerning Validity of Blood Alcohol
Content Analysis
Defendants charged with "drunk driving" offenses frequently con-
tend proper administrative procedure has not been followed, thus mak-
ing test results inadmissible. Former Florida Statutes section
322.262(3)71 provided in part that
Chemical analyses of the person's blood or breath, in order to
be considered valid under the provisions of this section, must have
been performed according to methods approved by the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services and by an individual possess-
ing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose.72
Under prior case law, the state had the burden of showing testing
provisions were followed. 73 Any analysis violating administrative rules
"equal treatment" to all drivers and may have led to the original amendment. See
Comment, Florida's 'Implied Consent' Statute: Chemical Tests for Intoxicated Driv-
ers, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 698, 716 (1968), which states, "A much fairer procedure
would be to inform the unconscious person after he regains consciousness of his rights
and at that time gave him a choice between having the evidence used against him or
having his license suspended."
70. 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 403, § 3(West).
71. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(3) (1981).
72. Id.
73. See State v. Wills, 359 So. 2d 566, 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("stat-
utes like Florida's . . . expressly condition the validity of test results on compliance
with health department regulations."); State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla.
1980) ("test results are admissible into evidence only upon compliance with the statu-
tory provisions and the administrative rules"). For civil cases, at least one Florida court
has decided compliance with the administrative rules and statutory implied consent
laws provisions is not required for admission of blood alcohol test results used to show a
driver's comparative negligence. Grant v. Brown, 429 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
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was inadmissible.7 4 Results were excluded for the state's failure to es-
tablish intoximeter registration,7 5 operator qualifications,'7 breathalyzer
equipment's non-accessibility to unauthorized personnel, 7 and equip-
ment's working condition.7 8
Whether such results will occur under the new Implied Consent
Law is questionable. Florida Statutes sections 316.1932(1)(b)79 and
316.1934(3)80 still authorize the Department to approve breath and
blood testing procedure. However both sections provide that "Any in-
substantial differences between approved techniques and actual testing
74. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services rules are in the Flor-
ida Administrative Code, chapter 1OD-42, Implied Consent. These supplement the De-
partment of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles regulations. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE,
ch. 15 B-3, Rules of Administering and Determining Chemical Tests for Intoxication.
75. See Turk v. State, 403 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Florida
Administrative Code, rule IOD-42.23 violated; unsigned photographic copy of machine
registration certificate fails to satisfy both best evidence rule, as not under seal required
by Florida statutes section 92.18, and hearsay rule since witness not qualified to estab-
lish copy as Business Record exception.)
76. See Turk, 403 So. 2d 1077 (Florida Administrative Code, rule 1OD-42.25
violated, copy of certificate establishing breathalyzer operator's qualifications not prop-
erly authenticated); Grala v. State, 414 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(blood test results improperly admitted, no proof of identity or qualifications of person
who withdrew blood, admisson harmless, evidence still sufficient to convict.) But see
Gillman v. State, 390 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1980) (blood sample drawn by hospital employee
who not yet completed one year's required work for permanent licensing as clinical
laboratory technologist improperly excluded; letter permitting temporary work as
clinical laboratory technologist sufficient authorization).
77. See Wills, 359 So. 2d at 568 (former H.R.S. rule 1OD-42.07 requires only
"reasonable compliance" and not insuring "impossib[ility] for anyone other than au-
thorized personnel to obtain key" to drawer where machine kept; rule violated as multi-
ple keys of unauthorized personnel unlocked gun locker where machine was); State v.
Dixon, 50 Fla. Supp. 110 (Orange County 1980) (Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
rule 15B-3.03 rule violated; breathalyzer kept in open locker in room accessible to un-
certified personnel).
78. See Dixon, 50 Fla. Supp. at 110 (machine removed from service eleven days
after driver tested possibly not working properly when driver tested, failure to follow
monthly inspection rule requires results exclusion). Florida trial courts have also re-
cently excluded breath tests, because police radios may interfere with the breathalyzer
machine accuracy. See Radio interference causes breath tests to be thrown out, Fort
Lauderdale News, Dec. 12, 1982, at 18A, col 3.
79. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(b) (Supp. 1982).
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procedures in individual cases shall not render the test or test results
invalid.""1
Unfortunately, what the legislature considered "insubstantial dif-
ference" is unclear. When certain procedures are administratively man-
dated, arguably any deviation is "substantial" or else they should not
have been required. But to so construe section 316.1934(3) and
316.1932(1)(b) ignores the above quoted language. Since the integrity
of a scientific testing process is concerned, the state should produce
expert testimony about a deviation's possible effect.82 This recognizes
the burden case law places upon the state. Expert testimony would not
be needed in all cases - only those in which the administrative regula-
tions have not been followed.8 3 Initially any testing procedure should be
considered valid until the defense produces evidence showing deviation.
The prosecution then must prove the deviation does not effect the over-
all results.
Another question is whether a judge or jury initially determines
whether any difference is so "insubstantial" that test results are not
invalid. While the answer is not clear, strong indications exist that the
initial determination on admissibility of test results lies with the judge,
with the ultimate determination on their validity left to the jury. Cop-
polino established that the trial judge has wide discretion in admitting
scientific evidence and must determine whether any proffered tests are
"so unreliable and scientifically unacceptable that their admission into
evidence was error".8 4 The key word is "unreliable". Since standard
breath and blood testing procedures were established to avoid this, any
81. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(b); FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(3).
82. Who qualifies as an expert on the question of "insubstantial differences" is
another issue. Generally only breathalyzer technicians appear at drunk driving trials.
They may not be qualified to testify what happens when differences in administrative
or statutory procedures occur: "The technician merely follows prescribed routines, and
is not expected to understand their underlying fundamentals. He knows how, but not
why." Kirk, The Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 393, 394
(1964), cited in Gianelli, supra note 59, at 1214-15. Arguably a manufacturer's repre-
sentative is necessary.
83. See Bender v. State, 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980): "When the prosecution
presents testimony in evidence concerning motor vehicle driver intoxication, which in-
cludes an approved alcohol test method by a properly licensed operator, the fact finder
may presume the test procedure is reliable. ...
84. 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
1 196 Nova Law Journal
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deviation from them could affect the results' reliability. Coppolino
seems to embody the procedure mandated by Florida Statutes section
90.105, Preliminary Questions85 stating in part: "(1) the court shall
determine preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of
evidence."8 6
If a difference between testing procedures used and those required
by regulations is not "insubstantial", the results should be excluded and
not considered by the jury. If the judge determines any differences
would not affect the testing results' reliability, the jury is allowed to
accept them or not.
Should the judge's initial determination be made in the jury's
presence? Unfortunately section 90.105 does not afford a definite an-
swer. Section 90.105(3) requires hearings outside the jury's presence
only when confessions are involved. For other preliminary matters sec-
tion 90.105(3) requires them to be held outside the jury's presence
85. Coppolino declared that
the question is not actually one of sufficiency or weight of the evidence for
there was ample evidence before the jury to support its finding as to cause
of death. Instead, the queston really involves the competency of the evi-
dence. That is, should the trial judge have allowed into evidence testimony
concerning Dr. Umberger's tests.
Id. at 70, (emphasis added).
Subsequent Florida cases recognize the initial determination on scientific evidence is
the judge's alone. See Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(evaluating questions of relevancy, materiality and competency for judge). Jent v.
State, 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1981) (determination for court to make on reliability).
86. FLA. STAT. § 90.105 (1981). The section states in full:
Preliminary questions-
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), the court shall determine prelimi-
nary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence.
(2) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the existence of a pre-
liminary fact, the court shall admit the proffered evidence when there is
prima facie evidence sufficient to support a finding of the preliminary fact.
If prima facie evidence is not introduced to support a finding of the prelim-
inary fact, the court may admit the proffered evidence subject to the sub-
sequent introduction of prima facie evidence of the preliminary fact.
(3) Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall be conducted out of
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be
similarly conducted when the interests of justice require or when an ac-
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"when the interests of justice require or when an accused is a witness,
if he so requests." 87 Arguably, a defendant's testimony may sometimes
be needed to meet the initial burden of producing evidence that some
difference exists.88 In these cases, the jury cannot be present. But when
the defense shows a difference only through cross-examination of prose-
cution witnesses, the jury may be present.89 Indeed judicial economy
may be served by having jurors present. If results are ultimately sub-
mitted for their consideration, defense counsel can be expected to em-
phasize on cross examination the differences involved, hoping jurors
will use them to disregard test results. Thus by having jurors present
when the preliminary issue is determined, needless repitition of testi-
mony is avoided.
What happens if the jury hears testimony on this preliminary
question, and the judge excludes test results because a substantial dif-
ference exists? If the state dismisses its case, no harm is done. How-
ever, if the state continues, is a mistrial necessary? The answer seems
to be "it depends." If the judge determines an instruction to disregard
the excluded evidence would suffice, the trial can continue. If not, then
mistrial is the only remedy.90 By adding this new language, the Legisla-
87. FLA. STAT. § 90.105(3) (1981).
88. For example, the defendant could testify that during the twenty minute re-
quired observation period he drank liquid or vomited, thus affecting test results. See
FLA. ADMIN. CODE, rule IOD-42.24.
89. An analogy may be drawn to admissibility of co-conspirator statements
under the Federal rules of Evidence. Even federal courts which suggest preliminary
foundations for co-conspirator statements should be done outside the jury's presence do
not always require this procedure.
United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g en banc, 590 F.2d
575 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979), held Federal Rule of Evidence
104 (a) requires a judge to make determinations of the admissibility of co-conspirator
statements unders rule 801(d)(2)(E) "whenever reasonably practicable" before admit-
ting the statements themselves. Subsequent decisions establish this procedure is not
mandatory, and judges may admit co-conspirator statements subject to later "connect-
ing up" at trial. See United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1982).
90. Again, experience with the federal co-conspirator exception supports this. See
James, 590 F.2d at 583 ("the judge must decide whether the prejudice arising from the
erroneous admission of the co-conspirator's statements can be cured by a cautionary
instruction to disregard the statement or whether a mistrial is required"); United
States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
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ture has created much uncertainty. Prosecutors may find it wiser not to
bring cases where any difference exists.
D. Florida Accident Report Privilege
Florida Statutes section 316.066,91 Written Report of Accidents,
requires every driver involved in an accident causing one hundred dol-
lars property damage or bodily injury to another person to file a written
report with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.
Likewise police officers investigating these accidents must make a re-
port within twenty-four hours. 2 To insure drivers' cooperation and to
preserve their fifth amendment Privilege against Self-incrimination,
section 316.066(4) provides in part that: "No such report shall be used
in evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an
accident. . .."93
Early case law applied this provision to drivers' statements
whatever form they took. The crucial consideration was whether the
statements were made to fulfill either the driver's or the investigating
officer's duty. Where an investigating officer recorded a driver's ver-
sion of an accident to satisfy his reporting duties, admission was pro-
hibited.9 4 Likewise, when drivers made statements to investigating of-
ficers to satify their statutory duty, bystanders who overheard them
could not testify. 5 However, only statements forming a basis for the
report were privileged - not the entire report itself. Thus police could
use accident reports to refresh their memory for purposes of testifying
about non-privileged matters.9 6
91. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(1) (Supp. 1982).
92. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(3)(a) (Supp. 1982).
93. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4) (Supp. 1982).
94. Stevens v. Duke, 42 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1949) (driver's oral statements to of-
ficer preparing accident report and driver's signed statement prepared by officer prop-
erly excluded as privileged in civil action arising out of accident).
95. Herbert v. Garner, 78 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1955) ("to allow one party to
establish their contents by the testimony of witnesses who may have overheard the
driver . . . making an oral report to the patrolman investigating it, would defeat the
purpose of the statute").
96. Lobree v. Caporossi, 139 So. 2d 510, 512-13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
See also Soler v. Kukula, 297 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (privilege
not prevent cross-examination based on report, if officer used report to testify on direct
199 1Drunk Driving Laws
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Besides a driver's oral statements, prior case law found privileged
those blood tests taken to complete an accident report and not for pos-
sible criminal charges. Where blood tests were done to complete the
accident investigation, the privilege attached and results excluded. 97
However, once an officer "changed his hat" and began a criminal inves-
tigaton any consensual statements or blood tests were not protected. 98
Ultimately the crucial test for deciding whether statements or blood
alcohol testing were within the privilege became "whether the informa-
tion sought to be excluded was taken .. .for the purpose of making
[an] accident report and formed a basis for that report." 99
Mere change from a civil to criminal investigation did not make
test results admissible unless a driver was clearly advised of the change.
An explicit warning easily achieves this; anything else is arguably in-
sufficient, since "to do any less simply erodes the protection which the
Legislature affords drivers". 100 Where one officer conducted both the
civil and criminal investigations, the officer's warning to the driver usu-
ally sufficed. 101 Where different officers were involved, whether the
same officer or a different one requested the blood test was often cru-
cial.102 The report's actual completion date or time was insignificant. 10 3
Under these interpretations of section 316.066(4) blood tests were
excluded where their results would have provided significant evidence
of intoxication. Case law construing the privilege as applied to blood
examination).
97. Cooper v. State, 183 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See also
State v. Thomas, 212 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
98. State v. Coffey, 212 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1968) (no doubt driver [knew]
investigation phase ended and blood being taken in connection with possible man-
slaughter charge).
99. State v. Mitchell, 245 So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 1971).
100. Elder v. Ackerman, 362 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(report excluded since unrealistic far sixteen year old driver at serious accident scene
"to discern the nuances of the dichotomy existing between investigations for automobile
accident reports investigations from the criminal aspects of automobile accidents").
101. Coffey, 212 So. 2d 632.
102. See State v. Edge, 397 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Timmons
v. State, 214 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970
(1969).
103. Mitchell, 245 So. 2d 618.
22




alcohol testing has been criticized as illogical and inconsistent.104 The
new law significantly changes Florida Statutes section 316.066(4). Oral
statements still remain privileged. However, chemical results are ex-
plicitly excluded from the privilege's scope: "The results of breath,
urine and blood tests administered . . . shall not fall within the confi-
dential privilege afforded by this subsection, but shall be admissible
into evidence in accordance with the provisions of § 316.1934(2)."1 °5
This is one of the better changes. Chemical tests are outside the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If tests are other-
wise validly taken, results should be admissible without privilege
problems under section 316.066.
E. Admissibility of Refusals of Testing
Some states explicitly exclude 08 while many explicitly admit 07 re-
fusals to submit to chemical testing. What happens when the state law
is silent on this issue? Unfortunately, decisions have gone both ways.108
Florida's situation before the new law's passage is typical of the confu-
104. See Note, Admissibility of the Results of Blood Test in a Criminal Case
Arising Out of an Auto Accident, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 978 (1968) ("The statu-
tory accident report privilege should not be used in a manner that will cause the exclu-
sion of evidence obtained under ... implied consent law when an accident results,");
Rumrell, Wrights & Havens, The Case for Admissibility of Blood Alcohol Test Re-
sults in Civil and Criminal Trials, 55 FLA. B.J. 362, 365 (May, 1981) ("The court-
created privilege against noncommunicative blood alcohol tests should be eliminted.").
105. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4).
106. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(e) (West. Supp. 1981).
107. See ALA. CODE § 32-A-5-194(c) (Supp. 1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-692(H) (Supp. 1982). Besides Florida, three other states recently amended their
Implied Consent laws to explicitly admit refusals. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , §
11.501.2(c) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001(C) (Supp. 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 487.805(4) (1979). 4
108. [Elven in those states ... . which are silent on the issue of admissi-
bility of a refusal to submit to the test, they come to opposite conclusions
as to the effect of the statute. Some hold that the option given by the
statute to refuse prevents the admissibility of evidence of the refusal, while
others hold that even though a person may refuse to take the test, this is
not a statutory right to refuse, and the evidence of such refusal is, there-
fore, not precluded by statute.
State v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, _, 613 P.2d 384, 386 (1980).
201 1
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sion. The first Implied Consent Law made driving a privilege in return
for which drivers impliedly consented to testing. Arrested drivers were
warned any refusal to submit would result in license suspension,"'0 but
no statutory language said whether such refusal was admissible. De-
spite the original Implied Consent Law's passage, Florida courts did
not allow admission of testing refusals. 110
The new Florida Implied Consent Law explicitly makes admission
109. Former Florida Statutes section 322.261(l)(a) (1981) stated in part
Any person who shall accept the privilege extended by the laws of this
state of operating a motor vehicle within this state shall by so operating
such vehicle be deemed to have given his consent to submit to an approved
chemical test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of his blood . . . Such person shall be told that his failure to sub-
mit to such a chemical test will result in the suspension of his privilege to
operate a motor vehicle....
But see State v. Gunn, 408 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (absence of
warning did not merit suppression of results); Pardo v. State, 429 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (giving of warning not a prerequisite to valid blood alcohol test in
criminal case; required only for imposition of license suspension for revocation of con-
sent to testing).
110. State v. Duke, 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), construed for-
mer Florida Statutes section 322.261(1)(a) in light of State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), cert. dismissed, 225 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1969) admitting a
refusal of nitrate testing as circumstantial evidence of guilt. Esperti distinguished Gay
v. Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that admisibility of
refusal violated privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968),
finding the driver had been incorrectly given a choice to not submit, whereas in Esperti
there was no choice given. Gay v. Orlando's conclusion was considered dicta and a due
process rather than a privilege against self-incrimination decision. Since under Florida
Statutes section 322.261(1)(a), a legal choice did not exist, Duke found refusals
admissible.
However, in Sambrine v. State, 386 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme
Court declared
[a]ny careful reading of Section 322.261 leads to the inescapable con-
clution that a person is given the right to refuse testing. If this were not so,
it is unclear why the legislature provided for a definite sanction [license
suspension] and a detailed procedure for the enforcement of such
suspension.
Id. at 548.
Sambrine admittedly did not directly deal with the issue of testing refusals admis-
sibility. Subsequent cases have applied it to this situation and consider it as disapprov-
ing Duke. See Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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a consequence of refusal. Florida Statutes section 316.1932(1)(a) pro-
vides that when a driver is "lawfully arrested" and police have "reason-
able cause to believe" the driver is under the influence, "[r]efusal to
submit to a chemical breath or urine test upon request .. .shall be
admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding."",,
However, despite this explicit language, admitting evidence of a
refusal has until recently presented constitutional questions involving
the privilege against self-incrimination. While this issue seems settled
in favor of a refusal's admissibility, due process problems in doing so
may still be very much alive. Thus discussion of both these areas is
necessary.
The Florida and United States Supreme Courts have rejected all
constitutional challenges to blood alcohol testing per se. Even before
the first Implied Consent law's enactment, Florida addressed a Privi-
lege against Self-Incrimination objection to blood sampling in
Touchton v. State."2 A vehicular manslaughter defendant had been
arrested and taken to a hospital where blood used to show intoxication
was taken. Rejecting claims that this procedure violated the Florida
privilege against self-incrimination,"' the court noted the blood sample
had not been protested. After Touchton, the propriety of blood extrac-
tions arose in Schmerber v. California1 4 where a hospital physician,
acting under police direction, withdrew blood from an arrested driver,
who protested based on advice of counsel. The Court acknowledged ex-
tracting blood over protest was 'compulsion' for fifth amendment pur-
poses. However, the main issue was whether this required the driver "to
be a witness against himself.""' 5 Distinguishing between physical and
testimonial evidence, the Court found no violation, holding "the privi-
lege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide. . . evidence of a testimonial or commu-
nicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analy-
111. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a) (Supp. 1982).
112. 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752 (1944).
113. At that time FLA. CONsT. Declaration of Rights, § 12 provided in part: "No
person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
This provision is presently contained in section 9, FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights,
Florida Constitution.
114. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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sis . . did not involve compulsion to these ends."116
Following Schmerber, Florida joined a number of states passing
Implied Consent laws requiring drivers to submit to chemical testing
through breath or blood sampling under certain conditions.1 7 In State
v. Mitchell,1i8 a manslaughter defendant challenged a blood sample
taken pursuant to former Florida Statutes section 322.261 (1)(b)"Il
without his consent and before his arrest. Agreeing, the Second District
Court of Appeal relied on the absence of consent to find a Privilege
against Self-Incrimination violation.1 20 The Florida Supreme Court re-
versed citing Schmerber where the blood sample taken over the driver's
protest was not excluded on fifth amendment grounds. Subsequent
cases extended Mitchell to breath tests as well.12 '
While Schmerber held a blood test does not violate fifth amend-
ment principles, the Supreme Court created uncertainty about what
would happen if a driver refused testing. 22 Generally, courts have un-
116. Id.
117. For discussion of problems posed by the original Implied Consent Law, see
Comment, supra note 69.
118. 245 So. 2d 618.
119. Former Florida Statutes section 32.261(1)(c) (1981) allowed blood extrac-
tions if a driver's physical condition made it "impractical" or "impossible" to adminis-
ter other testing. See text accompanying note 58 for discussion of this provision.
120. 227 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
121. See State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1980).
122. This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State tried to
show that the accused had incriminated himself when told that he would
have to be tested. Such incriminating evidence may be an unavoidable by-
product of the compulsion to take the test, especially for an individual who
fears the extraction or opposes it on religious grounds. If it wishes to com-
pel persons to submit to such attempts to discover evidence, the State may
have to forgo the advantage of any testimonial products of administering
the test-products which would fall within the privilege.***
Petitioner has raised a similar issue . . ., in connection with a police
request that he submit to a 'breathalyzer' test ... He refused the request,
and evidence of his refusal was admitted. . . He argues that the introduc-
tion of this evidence and a comment by the prosecutor .. upon his refusal is
ground for reversal under Griffin v. California, . . . We think general
Fifth Amendment principles, rather than the particular holding of Griffin,
would be applicable in these circumstaces, see Miranda v. Arizona ...
Since trial here was conducted after our decison in Malloy v. Hogan, . ..
making those principles applicable to the States . . . petitioner's conten-
26
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dertaken a two-step analysis in deciding whether statutes atithorizing
admission of refusal against a driver are constitutional: first considering
whether admission would violate. the Privilege against Self-Incrimina-
tion; and then, if necessary, considering whether admission would vio-
late Due Process because either the driver has been misled into believ-
ing a right to refuse existed or because the refusal is of low probative
value and its admission would unduly pressure drivers to testify. Each
of these objections to admitting refusals is briefly discussed below.
1. Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Shortly after Schmerber, the California Supreme court decided
two companion cases providing the main arguments against constitu-
tional attacks. People v. Ellis 23 held admitting a defendant's refusal to
speak for voice identification was permissible since the voice tests were
physical evidence rather than testimonial evidence. 2" When the defen-
dant wrongfully refused to do so, his refusal was admissible not as tes-
timonial evidence but circumstantial conduct from which a jury could
infer guilt, much like escape.' 25 People v. Sudduth12' applied this rea-
soning to refusals of breath testing. Since under Schmerber no right to
tion is foreclosed by his failure to object...
384 U.S. at 765-66 n.9.
As could be expected, this language has received differing interpretations from
courts and commentators. Compare Comment, The Admissibility of Refusals In
Drunk Driving Prosecutions: A Violation of the Fifth Amendment, 10 PAc. L.J. 141
(1978); and Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78
YALE L.J. 1074 (1969) with Cohen, The Case for Admitting Evidence of Refusal to
Take a Breath Test, 6 TEX. TECH L. REv. 927 (1975); Hauser, Admissibility of Re-
fusal to Submit to Blood Alcohol Test, 6 NOVA L.J. 209 (1982); Arenella, Schmerber
and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination. A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31
(1982).
123. 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr 385 (1966).
124. "[T]he speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts,
but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated
sounds, the verbal meaning of which are unimportant." Id. at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at
387.
125. "[I]t can scarcely be contended that the police, who seek evidence from the
test itself, will tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to produce this
evidence." Id. at 397, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
126. 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966).
205 11 7:1983
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refuse testing existed, comment on such refusal violated no constitu-
tional privilege. Any contrary result encouraged destruction of evidence
and escape from convictions.
The Ellis-Sudduth circumstantial evidence rationale has been
used by most courts to find no constitutional violation.127 However,
shortly after Sudduth, Florida, in Gay v. Orlando,128 became the first
,state subscribing to a contrary minority viewpoint. There, the admis-
sion of a driver's refusal to allow a breathalyzer test resulted in reversal
of his conviction. The Fourth District Court of Appeal relied on
Schmerber to find the refusal a testimonial by-product 29 and found
compulsion because of the driver's situation, "a choice of either volun-
tarily submitting to the test or refusing and thereby making a self-in-
criminating statement."1 '' Whether by design or otherwise, Gay v. Or-
lando neither mentioned Ellis nor explained why it disapproved the
refusal as circumstantial evidence analysis. While Gay has been much
127. See, e.g., Campbell v. Superior court, 106 Ariz. 542, , 479 P.2d 685, 692
(1971) ("person does not have a right to refuse and because refusal is not 'testimonial
communication' . . . comment ... not improper"); City of Westerville v. Cunning-
ham, 150 Ohio St. 2d 121, .. , 239 N.E.2d 40, 41 (1968) ("reasonable to infer that a
refusal ... indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test and his conscious-
ness of guilt,"); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. 131, _, 324 A.2d 441,
450 (1979); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, ... , 202 N.W.2d 202, 203 (1972); State v.
Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, _, 613 P.2d 384, 385 (1980) ("refusal[s] . . .could
each be treated as an act or conduct indicating consciousness of guilt"; however ex-
cluded per state law). Some pre-Schmerber cases used the same analysis to admit re-
fusals. Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, -, 81 S.E.2d 614, 618 (1954)
("merely details the behavior or conduct of the accused"); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa
1168, 1171, 300 N.W. 275, 277 (1941) ("the refusal was merely a circumstance to be
considered."); State v. Durrant, 55 Del. 510, .. , 188 A.2d 526, 528 (1963) ("it is
proper in a criminal case to show defendant's conduct .... The fact that defendant
declined to submit to a sobriety test is such a circumstance which a jury may
consider.").
For two criticisms of the Ellis-Sudduth circumstantial evidence rationale see
Comment, supra note 122, at 153-57 and Arenella supra note 122, at 46-47.
128. 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968).
129. "[P]etitioners' statement was self-incriminating and carried an inference of
guilt. In fact, it is difficult to see any relevancy ... other than providing such an
inference." Id. at 898.
130. Id.
1206 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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criticized,131 several courts cited it to find admission of refusals -a fifth
amendment violation.1 32 Other cases have reached similar results.133
131. See Hauser, supra note 122; Cohen, supra note 122; Comment, Admissibil-
ity of Testimonial By-Products of a Physical Test, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 50, 58-59
(1969) ("the decision is in conflict with the growing body of legal opinion").
132. See Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607, 188 S.E.2d 416 (1972); State v.
Jackson, 637 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1981), cert. granted, vacated and remanded for reconsid-
eration, Montana v. Jackson, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983). Arguably, Johnson could have
relied on a non-constitutional evidentiary basis for excluding refusals, rather than a
fifth amendment one, stating "[T]he refusal to take such tests are not relevant to the
question of guilt or innocence although the statute itself authorizes the results to be
allowed in evidence and creates a presumption in certain situations." 188 S.E.2d at
417. Gay excluded refusals not because of irrelevancy, but precisely because they were
relevant, testimonial and compelled.
133. See State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); State v. Adams, 247 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1978).
The clearest articulation of the minority view is Clinard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 716
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Clinard first decided refusals were testimonial under general
fifth amendment principles:
a defendant's silence or negative reply to a demand or request by an
officer made upon him while under the necessary compulsion attendant
with custodial arrest, which demand or question reasonably called for an
immediate reply by the defendant, is clearly a tacit or overt expression and
communication of the defendant's thoughts in regard thereto.
Id. at 718.
Clinard then, unlike Gay, addressed the circumstantial evidence argument and
concluded it was erroneous.
[I]f an accused under custodial arrest is requested or offered a chemi-
cal test for intoxication, anything he does other than affirmatively agree to
same is a refusal to submit. Thus, escape and flight are not 'compelled', a
necessary factor under the Fifth Amendment, but a refusal to take a
chemical test by silence or negative reply to a State's request or offer is
compelled.
Id. at 718-19.
Few cases finding refusals admissible did more than merely cite the Schmerber
footnote for the proposition that the issue was left undecided there. Newhouse v. Mis-
terly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970), relying on Ellis
and Sudduth to find no privilege violation resulted from admitting refusals attempted
to deal with the usually ignored Schmerber language. "The first portion. . . discusses
an accused who incriminates himself 'when told that he would have to be tested'. . ..
In context the Court seems here to be talking of an incriminatng statement by the
accused which is induced by the requirement that the test be taken. . . ." Id. at 518.
If no such statement was made, Newhouse considered the first part of the Schmer-
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Fortunately the United States Supreme Court has recently resolved
any question involving admissions of refusals and the fifth amendment
Privilege against Self-Incrimination.
In South Dakota v. Neville,'" an arrested driver declined a blood
alcohol test after being warned several times that his refusal could lead
to loss of driving privileges."i 5 Before trial he successfully moved to
suppress all evidence of the refusal. On the state's appeal from the sup-
pression order, the South Dakota Supreme Court, while recognizing
there may be no federal constitutional right to refuse blood-alcohol
testing, determined a refusal's admission violated a driver's fifth
amendment rights. The court first decided a refusal was a communica-
tive act1"8 for fifth amendment purposes and also decided the evidence
ber footnote inapplicable. Refusal was not a statement but conduct indicating a guilty
conscience. In a curious bit of reasoning, Newhouse also found the second part
inapplicable.
Read together,. the two portions . . . indicate that a refusal to take a
blood test is not a testimonial 'statement' within the Fifth Amendment;
rather, it is a best described as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt.
See People v. Ellis. Nonetheless, the reference to the Miranda footnote
can be read to imply that where an underlying right to refuse such a blood
test is present, it would be improper to draw adverse inferences from fail-
ure of the accused to respond to a request . . . because the accused would
thereby be penalized for exercising his rights to refuse the test.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Newhouse implied such "underlying right" arose from state statutes or state con-
stitutional decisions governing refusals. Close scrutiny demonstrates that such reason-
ing would have eliminated all federal constitutional considerations when deciding
whether a refusal is admissible. If a statute or state constitutional decision gave a right
to refuse testing, cases should be decided on the basis of the statutory language or state
constitutional law, not federal constitutional principles. If so, then the Court's indica-
*tion that "general Fifth Amendment principles" should apply in analyzing refusals to
submit to breath testing would become meaningless.
134. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
135. South Dakota's Implied Consent Law originally gave drivers the right to
refuse breath testing, See S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 32-23-10 (1973). Admitting a
driver's refusal violated this statutory right. State v. Oswald, 90 S.D. 342, 241 N.W.2d
566 (1976). However the South Dakota legislature subsequently changed its Implied
Consent Law to provide that "such refusal may be admissable into evidence at the
trial." See S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1982).
136. "A defendant's silence or refusal to submit to a requested blood test is a
tacit or overt expression and communication of defendant's thoughts." State v. Neville,
1208 7:1983 1
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was "compelled" by the arrest circumstances."' 7
Accepting certiorari to resolve the conflict among the states on this
question, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court first
noted Schmerber would clearly permit states to force suspected drivers
to give blood alcohol tests and characterized the passage of implied
consent laws as means "to avoid violent confrontations".1 38 While ac-
knowledging the Ellis-Sudduth argument that refusals are physical
acts from which evidence of guilt can be circumstantially inferred
rather than communications or testimony, the Court declined to rest its
decision on this basis.139 Instead the Court found "compulsion" for the
fifth amendment purposes was not present based upon two factors.
First, the Court noted "the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting
the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' ,,.14o Clearly Neville did not
present such a situation. Indeed, since the police respected the driver's
refusal of testing, there was a total lack of physical force. Second, the
Court noted the driver was clearly given a choice: submit to testing or
have his refusal admitted at trial. The ultimate choice between the al-
ternatives was made by the driver, not by the state. The mere fact that
the driver was compelled by law to decide between these did not involve
a fifth amendment violation. While not every situation where an indi-
vidual is forced to choose between two alternatives will mean there is
no "compulsion", 41 since South Dakota could have lawfully eliminated
312 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1982) (citing Gay v. Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. (1967) as authority).
137. In essence, the court found the driver caught between two choices: cooperat-
ing and possibly incriminating himself or refusing and possibly doing the same. State v.
Neville, 312 N.W. at 726.
138. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 921.
139. The Court most likely did so in order to avoid having to re-consider in fu-
ture cases when consciousness of guilt could be fairly inferred from refusals and when
it could not.
While we find considerable force in the analogies to flight and suppression
of evidence . . ., we decline to rest our decision on this ground. As we
recognized in Schmerber, the distinction between real or physical evidence,
on the one hand, and communications or testimony, on the other, is not
readily drawn in many cases. The situations arising from a refusal present
a difficult gradation [between various types of refusals]."
Id. at 921-22 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976)).
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any choice whatever and forcibly obtained the evidence, the mere fact
it set up an alternative with possible unpleasant ramifications did not
make any constitutional difference.142 Thus the Court held "a refusal to
take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it,
is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination."143
After Neville, the constitutionally of Florida Statutes section
316.1932(l)(a) is no longer debatable.
2. Due Process Grounds
Due process problems with admitting refusals may exist for two
reasons. First, the driver may be misled about the right to refuse or
consequences of refusal. Second, courts may feel refusals lack probative
value and unfairly force drivers to offer explanatory testimony.
Drivers can be misled about their rights to refuse in a number of
ways. The clearest instance occurs when an arrested driver is told he
has the right to refuse testing even though state law grants none.
Under such circumstances admitting a refusal would be unfair since its
probative value is difficult to ascertain. The driver could be refusing
because of fear of failing the test or merely due to a choice to take
what was represented as a legal right. Indeed, writers disagreeing with
Gay v. Orlando's discussion argue it is more properly interpreted on
due process grounds.1 44 Likewise in State v. Duke,1 45 although the
court found no statutory right to refuse testing, it decided the driver
could have been misled by the arresting officer into believing he had a
ment problems: First, where a criminal defendant would be given the choice of either
truthfully testifying involuntarily, falsely testifying thus risking perjury charges, or de-
clining to testify thus risking contempt charges. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
378 U.S. 52 (1964) and second, where the given alternative was so-unpleasant a person
would almost certainly admit guilt. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 ("a test so painful,
dangerous or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs").
142. "[T]he choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an
easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires
suspects and defendants to make difficult choices." Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
143. Id.
144. See Hauser, supra note 122, at 237-38; Comment, supra note 131, at 56-
58.
145. 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
32




legal choice.14 If Miranda warnings are given to an arrested driver,
the driver may believe a refusal is allowed. Even pre-Neville cases
holding admission did not violate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion have recognized this possibility. 147 When this happens additional
admonitions are almost universally required.
Situations may occur where a person in custody does not have fair
notice of the limits of his rights,, and becomes confused about
whether he need comply with official directions. . . . where a
driver exhibits confusion as to the scope of his rights, the officers
should tell him of his duty to comply with directions or alterna-
tively elaborate on their description of his rights. 48
Florida case law contains no requirement that an additional admo-
nition be given that Miranda warnings do not provide a legal basis for
refusal. However Duke implies that such a warning should be required
to avoid misleading drivers.149 Such warnings should be required; espe-
cially since now Neville decided that admitting refusals does not violate
fifth amendment protections more states are likely to statutorily declare
that refusals should be admissible.
Additionally, after Neville, one Due Process issue has been settled.
146. The arresting officer told the driver, "I am now offering to give an approved
test of your breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of your blood."
Id. at 98. Emphasizing the officer's use of the word "offering", the court found "a
reasonable person in the defendant's position could believe he had a Legal choice as to
whether to submit to the test." Id.
147. See People v. Ellis, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966).
148. Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1969), relying on the
following language from Ellis
After having given [Mliranda warnings, if the police direct a defendant to
speak for voice identification and he refuses, they must, as a prerequisite to
the use of the defendant's refusal to speak as evidence of consciousness of
guilt, advise him that the right to remain silent does not include the right
to refuse to participate in such a test.
421 P.2d at 398-99.
See also State Dept. of Highways v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971).
149. "The defendant should have been told that the officer was prepared to give
an approved chemical test; that the driver did not have a right to refuse; but that if he
did refuse that his driver's license would be revoked for a period of three months." 378
So. 2d at 98.
211 1
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Besides raising Privilege against Self-Incrimination arguments, the
driver claimed Due Process was violated, because he was not told his
refusal could be used at trial. The driver argued his situation was anal-
ogous to that in Doyle v. Ohio'8 0 where the Court found admitting a
defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warning was fundamentally
unfair. The Court rejected this for two reasons. First, "the right to si-
lence underlying the Miranda warnings is one of constitutional dimen-
sion, and thus cannot be burdened." 151 The driver's right to refuse did
not arise from any constitutional right but from a statute existing only
through legislative grace. Second, Mirandd warnings emphasized the
disadvantages of speaking, not any adverse consequences from silence.
In Neville, the statutory warning about potential loss of driving privi-
leges, "contained no such misleading assurances as to the relative con-
sequences of his choice." 152 Indeed, if anything, the assurances were in
the opposite directon-refusal would lead to state action to suspend the
driver's license.1 83 Thus after Neville, mere failure to warn that refusal
of testing is admissible against the driver at trial does not violate due
process rights.
Although Florida law, like South Dakota's, provides that refusal of
testing is admissible, no statute requires the driver be so informed. Af-
ter Neville, the question still remains whether a warning should not be
legislatively required although its absence is admittedly not constitu-
tionally fatal. Why such a requirement is omitted is puzzling, consider-
ing how easy it would be to give such a warning. Police officers have
found no difficulty complying with the Miranda warnings in similar
circumstances. Moreover, whether drivers should be warned of a re-
fusal's consequences should be considered in connection with Florida
Statutes section 316.1932(a)'M stating "A warning of the consent pro-
vision of this section shall be printed above the signature line on each
new or renewed driver's license issued after the effective date of this
150. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
151. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
152. Id. at 924.
153. "It is true the officers did not inform respondent of the further consequence
that evidence of refusal could be used against him in court, but we think it unrealistic
to say that the warnings given here implicitly assure a suspect that no consequences
other than those mentioned will occur." Id.
154. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(e) (Supp. 1982).
1212 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
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Additional language should be included that any refusal of consent
would be admissible in court. Even commentators arguing refusals
should be admissible agree drivers should be so warned. 156 One state
supreme court requires such warnings." 7
States viewing refusals probative of a guilty conscience see no due
process problem in admitting them and possibly forcing drivers to tes-
tify. Other states have questioned the probative value of refusals. The
Supreme Court in Schmerber recognized that some factual circum-
stances cast considerable doubt on a refusal's relevance, although
Schmerber having no concerns based on fear, health or religion, did not
present such a situation. 158
Some courts consider only these instances,159 but others recognize
additional circumstances when admission would be unfair.1 60 The only
empirical study examining reasons for refusals concludes they stem
from unknown sources. 61 One Florida writer argues that forcing driv-
155. Id.
156. See Hauser, supra note 122, at 236-38; Arnella, supra note 122, at 57,
n.130. Indeed Neville suggests such should be done even though not constitutionally
required: "Since the State wants the suspect to submit to the test, it is in its interest
fully to warn suspects of the consequences of refusal. We are informed that police
officers in South Dakota now warn suspects that evidence of their refusal can be used
against them in court." 103 S. Ct. at 924, n.17.
157. Puller v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 1285 (Alaska 1978); See
also State v. Parker 16 Wash. App. 632, _, 558 P.2d 1361, 1363 (1976) ("had the
statute intended evidentiary use of . . . refusal, it is logical that the arresting officer
would be required to inform [a driver] refusal could be used in a criminal
proceeding").
158. 384 U.S. at 771. Neville did not overrule this language.
159. See Ellis, 421 P.2d at 398.
160. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 247 S.E.2d 475, 478 (W. Va. 1978) ("where
there is no explanation of defendant's refusal offered, the evidence is untrustwor-
thy. . . . Defendant could have been afraid of the test itself and not the results. .. ");
State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 3 (Mont. 1981) ("not always reliable, and is highly preju-
dicial to the defendant, in effect forcing him to take the witness stand to explain...").
161. Argeriou, Refusal to Take Breathalyzer Test-Rebutting Adverse Presump-
tion, 11 CRImI. L. BULL. 350 (1975). This study of 281 drunk driving offenders using
ten variables to compare test takers versus nontakers concludes there is "little support
for the assumption that individuals who refused . . . did so as a result of heightened
'consciousness of guilt' and a conscious desire to avoid providing additional and specific
chemical evidence of their level of intoxication." Id. at 353.
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ers to offer explanations does not violate due process."6 2 However, this
is predicated on the belief the defendant could only be cross-examined
on the reasons for refusal, if he does not testify on other matters. Ar-
guably Florida Statutes section 90.612(2)163 allows for this. However
this argument ignores the last sentence, "The court may, in its discre-
tion permit inquiry into additional matters. 164
When discretion is exercised to allow widened cross-examination,
is reversal likely? Based on one recent case, the answer must be "no".
In MaGahee v. Massey,16 5 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a Florida
rape conviction. MaGahee was accused of attacking the victim on Oc-
tober 11, 1973. To prove he was the perpetrator, the state offered testi-
mony of another witness that the defendant exposed himself one month
before at the same place the rape occurred. MaGahee testified not
about the events of October llth, but that he was elsewhere at the
earlier time. When cross-examination went beyond this, defense coun-
sel's objection was overruled. Additionally, the prosector commented in
closing argument about McGahee's failure to testify about the October
1 th events. Both the Fourth District Courts of Appeals and the Flor-
ida Supreme Court affirmed without opinions.1 6 The Eleventh Circuit
denied a habeas corpus petition which argued that extended cross-ex-
amination violated fifth amendment privileges, since it considered these
waived when McGahee voluntarily chose to testify. The court distin-
guished this situation from instances where the defendant, by testifying
on collateral matters, does not open up the cross-examination. 167 Once
162. Hauser, supra note 122, at 239.
163. Florida Statutes section 90.612(2) (1981) states in part "Cross-examination
of a witness is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting the credibility of the witness."
164. Id.
165. 667 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982).
166. McGahee v. State, 302 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dis. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 311 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1975).
167. Calloway v. Wainwright, 409 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 909 (1969) was cited as an example of a collateral matter. Calloway found that
by testifying solely to a confession's circumstances, a defendant does not open up him-
self up to cross-examination or comment in closing argument on failure to testify about
other matters. The line is a fine one and easily crossed. See also United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338-40. (9th Cir. 1977) (limiting the Calloway collateral mat-
ter versus merits distinction to confessions alone, defendant's testimony to post-robbery
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a defendant testifies about the "merits", the cross-examination becomes
full-bloom. In McGahee this happened once the defendant testified on
the element of identity.
Refusal of chemical testing surely will not be considered a collat-
eral matter. Since the refusal is likely to happen at the arrest scene,
courts may easily surmise that by testifying about this, the defendant
opens himself up to cross-examination about everything happening at
the scene. Moreover, if courts consider refusal relevant to show a guilty
conscience, explaining why a person refused goes directly to the
"merits".
If Florida decides refusals should be admissible in certain cases,
better procedure would be to utilize Florida Statutes section 90.105,168
Preliminary Questions. Since the Supreme Court indicated admitting
refusals under certain circumstances violates due process, initial screen-
ing of reasons for refusal should be done at preliminary hearings. Ini-
tial decisions about a confession's voluntariness are solely for a
judge.'69 However, due process does not require a hearing outside the
jury's presence in every case of alleged suggestive identification since
determining an identification's reliability is a traditional jury role.170
However such hearings are "advisable" and sometimes "constitution-
ally necessary". 71 The issue of admitting testing refusal is significantly
different from a suggestive identification question. Other witnesses, es-
pecially the victim, are available for examination in an identification
case. However, in a refusal issue the driver is likely to be the only one
knowing why he refused the test.172 Forcing drivers to testify before a
jury on this would possibly subject them to extended cross-examination
and unfavorable inferences from not testifying on other matters.
public admissions of participation goes to merits), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
168. FLA. STAT. § 90.105, Preliminary Questions (1981).
169. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). This is necessary since a jury
might focus on the confession's reliability and not its voluntariness or be influenced in
the voluntariness decision by need to use the confession in evaluating a defendant's
guilt.
170. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
171. Id. at 349.
172. One exception might be where the driver refused for medical reasons. Then
a doctor could supply the needed explanation.
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Florida Statutes section 90.105(1)173 obligates judges to decide
"preliminary questions concerning" the admissibility of evidence. If the
defendant wishes to testify concerning his reason for refusal, the second
sentence of section 90.105(3)174 should require a preliminary hearing.
If the court finds refusal was for a valid reason, the refusal should be
excluded. 1 5 If the state meets its burden of disproving this 76 a refusal
would be submitted to a jury for consideration of its weight. Thus driv-
ers would be given some opportunity to demonstrate valid grounds for
refusal and not have to worry about waiving their fifth amendment
rights not to testify at trial.177
IV. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Forcible Blood Sampling
Florida courts have condemned taking blood samples from pro-
testing drivers. However all cases excluding forcible blood extractions
were based on the original Implied Consent Law's language. Former
Florida Statutes' section 322.261 (1)(c) 17 1 allowed blood tests when a
driver was "so incapacitated as to render impractical or impossible the
administration"1791 of a breath test and acceptable medical standards
were followed. This provision has been retained by the new law.' 80
When blood sampling was done contrary to these provisions, the sample
173. See FLA. STAT. § 90.105(l) (1981).
174. FLA. STAT. § 90.105(3) (1981).
175. Not all courts agree reasons for refusal are a matter for courts initially. See
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 324 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1979), considering this a jury issue.
176. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), prosecution has burden of prov-
ing voluntariness of confession by preponderance of the evidence. Cf. Saltzburg, Stan-
dards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975) sug-
gesting that for confessions, dying declarations and some declarations against interest,
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard should be used for preliminary fact-finding.
177. Another alternative is to make refusals admissible only if the defendant tes-
tifies and not in the state's case-in-chief. Two states adopt this compromise approach.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1980).
178. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(c) (1981).
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70 for discussion of temporary
changes made in section 322.261(1)(c), now section 316.1932(2)(c).
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results were excluded."' 1
The Supreme Court has viewed unfavorably due process and
fourth amendment arguments against non-consensual blood testing.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 1 2 found a physician's blood extraction from an
unconscious driver in a hospital emergency room "would not be consid-
ered offensive by even the most delicate."'8 3 However, the Rochin v.
California18 4 situation where police illegally broke into a suspect's
home and forcibly pumped his stomach to make him regurgitate nar-
cotics and shocked the court's conscience as "brutal"18 5 and "offen-
sive"18s6 was distinguished from Breithaupt where no force other than
puncturing the skin occurred. This intrustion was considered small
when balanced against society's interest in detecting and deterring in-
toxicated drivers. Breithaupt emphasized that due process violations
depend not on personal reaction to a particular procedure but on what
the community considers offensive. Emphasizing the routineness of
such procedures, along with the states' widespread acceptance of blood
extractions,18 7 the Court concluded they were "not such 'conduct that
shocks the conscience' . . . nor such a method of obtaining evidence
181. In State v. Riggins, 348 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert.
dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1978), blood was forcibly taken from a resisting
driver. The court found "the implied consent evidenced by accepting the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle in this state may be revoked at the time the chemical test is
suggested .... Otherwise the sections providing for suspension upon refusal to submit
would be superfluous." Id. at 1210-11.
Likewise in Sambrine v. State, 378 So. 2d 96, blood was withdrawn from a driver
who refused a breathalyzer test. Disagreeing with the state's argument that only proba-
ble cause was needed, the court noted former section 322.1262(1)(c) provided for blood
sampling only when a driver was mentally or physically incapable of withdrawing the
implied consent. See also Brown v. State, 371 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), af'd per curiam, 386 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1980); Lytwyn v. State, 353 So. 2d 222
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); McDonald v. State, 364 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), excluding blood tests taken in violation of the Implied Consent Law.
182. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
183. Id. at 436.
184. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
185. Id. at 172.
186. Id. at 174.
187. Forty-seven states had approved chemical intoxication testing through ei-
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that it offends a 'sense of justice."188 Subsequently Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia189 likewise rejected a fourteenth amendment due process objec-
tion to blood extractions taken over a conscious driver's protest. In
Schmerber, the driver was conscious and had verbally, but not physi-
cally, protested the extraction. The Court refused to distinguish be-
tween invading the skin to secure blood samples of conscious as op-
posed to unconscious drivers. 190
Schmerber also considered fourth amendment objections to blood
extractions. The Court recognized blood extractions involve a search
and seizure1 91 but focused on whether they were "unreasonable" under
the circumstances. Probable cause based upon the smell of Schmerber's
breath and his general physical appearance supplied justificaton. Since
delay in getting a warrant threatened loss of evidence, none was re-
quired. Likewise the procedures used were reasonable because blood
sampling is generally effective in determining blood alcohol content and
the procedure as performed by a doctor in a hospital, comported with
standard medical practices. Fourth amendment objections to Florida's
Implied Consent law fared no better than fifth amendment claims.
State v. Mitchell 92 rejected fourth amendment arguments that arrest
was needed before blood could be taken, and recognized that the ques-
tion was rather the "relevance and likely success" of a blood test. 3
188. 352 U.S. at 437.
189. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
190. "We 'cannot see that it should make any difference whether one states un-
equivocally that he objects or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such condi-
tion that he is unable to protest."' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760, n.4 (citing Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. at 441 (Warren, J., dissenting)).
191. The seizure occurred when Schmerber was arrested at the hospital, followed
by the search which occurred when blood was taken from his body.
192. 245 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1971).
193. Id. at 622 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966)). See
also Filmon v. State, 336 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1976), cert. dismissed sub. nom., Filmon v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 980 (1980); State v. Edge, 397 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1981). But see United States v. Harvey, 701 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1983) construing blood
sampling in Schmerber as a search incident to lawful arrest, thus requiring formal
arrest before blood extraction unless consent given. Several states have upheld blood
samples from unconscious drivers on a different basis. In Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d
166 (Tex. Crim. 1982), blood taken from an unconscious driver was admitted over his
fourth amendment objections. The court agreed Schmerber was distinguishable since
there the driver was both under arrest and conscious. However the court justified the
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After Breithaupt and Schmerber, there is no constitutional prob-
lem with extracting blood from an unconscious or verbally protesting
driver. Other situations may present difficulties however. The new
"drunk driving" law adds a section on blood sampling going beyond
Breithaupt and Schmerber. Florida Statutes section 316.1933,194 Blood
Test for Impairment or Intoxication states in part:
(1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to
[breath or urine tests] or any recognized power to revoke the im-
plied consent to such tests, if a law enforcement officer has proba-
ble cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual
physical control of a person while under the influence of alcoholic
beverages or controlled substances has caused the death or serious
bodily injury of a human being, such person shall submit, upon
request of a law enforcement officer, to a test of his blood for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood or the
presence of controlled substances. The law enforcement officer may
use reasonable force, if necessary to require such person to submit
to the administration of the blood test.*** 19 5
Whether the provision allowing police to "use reasonable force, if
necessary" constitutionally affords an arrested driver due process is
questionable. As mentioned above, Breithaupt and Schmerber both re-
jected due process violations. However, neither case covers the situation
contemplated by section 316.1933. Indeed Schmerber noted three situ-
ations where section 316.1933 presents problems. "It would be a differ-
ent case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reason-
able request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to
sampling based on Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), which upheld taking finger-
print scrapings from an unarrested defendant. Aliff noted both the routiness of blood
testing and the possibility evidence would be lost if delay ensued. This presented exi-
gent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. See also State v. Oevering, 268
N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1978); DeVaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 (Ind.
1972); Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1979); State v. Campbell, 615 P.2d
190 (Mont. 1980); State v. Heintz, 286 Or. 239, 594 P.2d 385 (1979) relying on simi-
lar reasoning to uphold blood sampling from severely injured or unconscious drivers.
194. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (Supp. 1982).
195. Id. at (1). "Serious bodily injury" is defined as "a physical condition which
creates a substantial risk of death or serious, personal disfigurement, or protracted loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Id.
2191
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resistance with inappropriate force".""
Arguably, the easiest situation to resolve occurs when a driver pro-
tests blood extraction and makes "a reasonable request to undergo a
different form of testing. 197 Schmerber specifically notes several rea-
sons a driver would do so: "Petitioner is not one of the few who on
grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple, might prefer
some other means of testing, such as the 'breathalyzer' test petitioner
refused. 98
Does Florida Statutes section 316.1933 require arresting officers to
first offer other tests or administer them if requested? The key lan-
guage appears in Florida Statutes section 316.1933's beginning: "Not-
withstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests pro-
vided in Fla. Stat. § 316.1932. ... "' Thus whether a driver is
capable of giving a breath or urine sample appears irrelevant if proba-
ble cause exists and serious bodily injury to another occurred. This lan-
guage clearly conflicts with the Schmerber dictum. Police may desire
blood sarhples because of their recognized reliability.200 However when
the desire to obtain blood conflicts with an individual's reasonable de-
sire for other testing methods, the alternatives should be constitution-
ally required. Under such conditions, Schmerber implies that no
amount of force, no matter how slight, is "reasonable". Several states
have recognized Schmerber's dictum by prohibiting blood sampling in
these circumstances.20 1 Forcibly taking blood when these arise violates
196. 384 U.S. at 760, n.4. This language was again cited with approval in Nev-
ille as examples of situations which could present Due Process problems. See 103 S.
Ct. at 921, n.9.
197. 384 U.S. at 760, n.4.
198. Id. at 771.
199. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (Supp. 1982).
200. Blood testing is generally considered the most reliable, followed by breath
testing and then urinalysis. See Fitzgerald & Hume, The Single Chemical Test for
Intoxication: A Challenge to Admissibility, 66 MASS. L. REV. 23 (1981); A. MOEN-
SSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 2.04-2.07 (2d ed.
1978). Ironically Perryman v. State, 242 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971),
upheld the propriety of denying blood tests to a driver who previously refused breath
testing.
201. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(d), (e) (Deering 1972) exempting from blood
testing hemophiliacs and persons taking anticoagulants for a heart conditon; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1982) exempts religious objectors.
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/1
due process, despite Florida Statutes section 316.1933's authorization.
The remaining two situations Schmerber contemplates involve the
same question, what is "reasonable force"? A literal reading of "if the
police initiated the violence, '20 2 could prevent use of any force once a
driver refuses. Since Schmerber also used the words "or responded to
resistance with inappropriate force,"203 the prior language should be
read as "if the police initiated the [unnecessary] violence."'204 Since
blood extractions involve searches and seizures, some courts after
Schmerber feel the question of "reasonable force" involves fourth
amendment considerations rather than due process ones. 0 5 Where
force is reasonable for fourth amendment purposes, it would satisfy due
process.
"Reasonableness" must be considered separately under each set of
facts. As stated by one court "[t]here is no slide-rule formula yet de-
vised for ascertaining whether specific conduct is or is not reasona-
ble." 206 Courts have considered searches of the body's exterior differ-
ently from searches involving invasions of the body's interior. Greater
justification is required when the body is invaded and the force used to
make such an invasion should be closely scrutinized. 0 Unfortunately,
after Schmerber, few cases address the constitutionality of forcible
blood extractions. Many are decided on other issues, such as violations
of state Implied consent laws. Florida can no longer consider blood
sampling solely in statutory violation terms when the section 316.1933's
conditions exist. Thus examination of case law dealing with other bod-
ily invasions is needed.
Bodily invasions are common in narcotics border searches. While
202. 384 U.S. at 760, n.4.
203. Id
204. Id.
205. See Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 914 (1958); People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 528 (1975). Even before Rochin, Breithaupt and Schmerber, one writer argued
courts were merging due process and fourth amendment "reasonableness" standards.
Bachelder, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41 CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1950).
206. Blackford, 247 F.2d at 751.
207. See Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968) (penis scraping to obtain
victim's menstrual blood permissible search incident to lawful arrest involving no intru-
sion of body's surface), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1123 (1969).
17:1983 221 1Drunk Driving Laws
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there is often official force used to search the person's body, the courts
have usually upheld the constitutionality of the law enforcement ac-
tions involved. Shortly after Breithaupt, Blackford v. United States08
challenged the forcible extraction of narcotics from a defendant's rec-
tum. Blackford was forcibly restrained and undressed, then subjected
to an unsuccessful anal probe. Following this, several forcibly given en-
emas resulted in recovery of narcotics. Applying a "reasonableness"
test claimed to be stricter than a due process scrutiny, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found substantial factual similarity to Breithaupt and many differ-
ences with Rochin.
Rochin was subjected to a whole series of abuses and violations of
his rights commencing with the unlawful entry into his dwelling,
continuing with the forcible attempt by the officers to prevent him
from swallowing the capsules, and culminating with the forcible
stomach pumping. In contrast, Blackford was treated civilly
throughout and was subjected to physical pressure only when the
examinations were to be performed. 09
The court dismissed claims the procedures used inflicted unreason-
able pain. As long as the infliction was not malicious or excessive no
problem existed. Numerous cases have relied on Blackford's interpreta-
tion of Rochin and upheld anal searches, 210 emefics, 211 and stomach
pumping212 to force narcotics from a suspect's body.
Like body searches at the border, operations to recover bullets
from a defendant's body involve fourth amendment and due process
issues. Generally, the courts have upheld such procedures. In United
States v. Crowder,21 3 an operation to recover a bullet from the defen-
208. 247 F.2d 745.
209. Id. at 752.
210. See Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Ng Pui Yu v.
United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965).
211. See Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 381
U.S. 920 (1965); Barrera v. United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960); Blefare v.
United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
212. Belfare, 362 F.2d 870. Cf. People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624 (non border
search found unreasonable because no warrant obtained, unnecessary to consider due
process issue).
213. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
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dant's arm was permitted. The operation was a minor surgical proce-
dure done under acceptable medical conditions, with probable cause to
believe it would produce relevant evidence. 14
Are border searches and operations distinguishable from blood
sampling? All involve bodily invasion. Border searches and operations
for bullets are necessary to obtain evidence which may not be obtaina-
ble otherwise. However, in regard to blood alcohol testing less intrusive
breath and urine tests exist. Moreover, to some people blood sampling
will be more dangerous than minor operations or border search devices.
Yet since section 316.1933 gives police authority to require blood sam-
pling as long as "reasonable force" is used the driver has no opportu-
nity to prevent being exposed to the danger. Although in blood sam-
pling the Supreme Court recognizes delay will result in loss of
evidence, this relates only to the need for testing, not the exact method
chosen. A recent New York case illustrates this important distinction.
Matter of Abe A.; Jon L. v. District Attorney,215 upheld an order re-
quiring blood samples needed to connect the defendant with his busi-
ness partner's murder. Blood at the scene was of two types; the victim's
and a rare kind belonging to one percent of the population. After decid-
ing probable cause existed and safe medical procedures would be used,
the court noted that "no alternative means of obtaining the evidence
was brought forward. .. 216 This situation contrasts greatly with the
usual drunk driving case where alternatives are available to determine
blood alcohol content. Measured by this criteria, section 316.1933 can-
not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
A few cases exclude blood samples because of due process viola-
tions resulting from either police initiated force or unnecessary force in
214. Before the operation, a warrant was issued approving only the recovery of a
bullet in the arm. A second bullet was left undisturbed, since an operation to secure
this presented danger of permanent damage. See also State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d
621 (Mo. 1977); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1972), cert.
dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); State v. Allen, 291 S.E.2d 459 (S.C. 1982); State v.
Martin, 404 So. 2d 960 (La. 1981). Contra Indiana v. Adams, 229 N.E.2d 834 (Ind.
1973), cert. denied sub nom., 415 U.S. 935 (1974), adopting per se rule that surgical
removal of bullets violates fourth amendment.
215. 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265 (1982).
216. Id. at __, 437 N.E.2d at 271.
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response to a suspect's resistance. In People v. Kraft,217 while the ac-
tual procedure used to extract blood was medically safe, the surround-
ing circumstances made the process medically unacceptable. Police ar-
rested Kraft after an accident and took him to a local hospital
handcuffed. One officer punched Kraft to force him into the hospital,
without any good reason for doing so. Once the handcuffs were re-
moved, the driver objected to the blood extraction on morality grounds.
When he resisted, his arms were grabbed and he was led to an exami-
nation room where he was pushed onto the floor and held down by two
officers until blood was taken. The court found the police "were aggres-
sive beyond all need." '218 Likewise, in United States v. Townsend,2 1 9 the
defendant was beaten without explanation and had his arms twisted
when he resisted efforts to scrape his penis for blood samples in a rape
case. Citing Rochin, the court found this violated due process.
Kraft and Townsend demonstrate the excessive police action Flor-
ida Statutes section 316.1933(1) may generate.2 Why did the legisla-
ture pass such a provision considering other sections of the new Implied
Consent law? Breathalyzers show the same results as blood analysis;
when a refusal occurs, the new law makes it admissible. Since the Su-
preme Court in Neville upheld admitting evidence of refusals, §
316.1933(1) will do more harm than good. Implied Consent laws were
passed to prevent the very violence section 316.1933(1)(a) may
cause.221 Considering there were incidents of police violence under the
former Implied Consent Law222 this section will only encourage more.
217. 3 Cal. App. 3d 890, 84 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1970).
218. 3 Cal. App. 3d -, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
219. 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957).
220. See also People v. Allen, 86 Cal. App. 3d 948, 150 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1978)
police officer's putting gun to defendant's neck and threatening to shoot unless sus-
pected heroin balloons were not swallowed, violated due process since "the officers were
aggressive beyond all need." Id. at -, - P.2d -, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
221. "In general, legislatures have recognized that people under the influence of
alcohol tend to be more abusive, and combative than they would be if sober. To require
law enforcement officials to withdraw blood could easily lead to a pitched battle be-
tween police and the accused." Hauser, supra note 122, at 222.
222. See, e.g., State v. Riggins, 348 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
where police sat on a driver and twisted his broken arm to force submission. Unsuccess-
ful, they threatened to jail him even though he was catheterized. Not surprisingly, at
this point the driver gave the sample.
1224 7:1983 1
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Hopefully section 316.1933(l)(a) will be seldom improperly utilized
and soon repealed or declared unconstitutional.
B. Miranda Warnings and Drunk Driving
Another Privilege against Self-Incrimination question is whether
arrested drivers must be given Miranda warnings. Under present Flor-
ida practices, arresting officers fill out an Alcohol Influence Report
before chemical testing.2 23 The report contains not only the arresting
officer's observation of the driver, but also specific questions drivers
must be asked.224 The answers may affect the weight given chemical
test results showing a driver's blood alcohol content. Since the statutory
presumptions resulting from chemical influence are only "prima facie"
evidence and not conclusive, 25 a driver's trial testimony can explain
why the results should be ignored.2 26 However, by providing the infor-
mation police ask for, drivers may assist the state in building its case.
Miranda v. Arizona227 held that whenever a person is in custody and
under interrogation, certain warnings must be given prior to question-
ing to apprise the individual of his fifth amendment rights.2 Since by
statute a driver must be "lawfully arrested" before being required to
undergo chemical testing, Miranda's custody requirement is satis-
fied.229 Likewise the questions asked constitute "interrogation. 23 °
223. Florida Highway Patrol Form No. 711.
224. For example, the driver is asked: "Have you been drinking?" and "Are you
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage now?" Id.
225. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c) (Supp. 1982).
226. See Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 200, at 28-35 discussing factors affect-
ing an individual's blood alcohol level.
227. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
228. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any ques-
tioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
229. Miranda indicates custody exists "After a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
Courts have difficulty dealing with the second part of this definition. A narrow con-
struction would allow more police questioning without warnings. In State v. Roberti,
644 P.2d 1104 (Or. 1982), a police officer admitted he intended to arrest before ques-
225[117:1983
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Only two Florida cases discuss whether drivers charged with traffic
offenses should be given Miranda warnings. County of Dade v. Calla-
han2 31 considered whether Miranda warnings should be given before
field sobriety or breathalyzer tests are administered. Merely citing
cases from other states finding Miranda warnings unnecessary in drunk
driving cases, the court held that since the driver was charged with
violating a city ordinance making drunk driving a petty offense, no
warnings were needed. In State v. Oliverl23 an arrested driver refused
to answer questions asked before a breath test was taken. The county
court refused to suspend his license holding he was "under no obliga-
tion to answer questions or to perform physical tests. His sole duty is to
blow into the breathalyzer machine."2 3 However, the Circuit Court re-
versed, based on Callahan and the additional rationale that since im-
plied consent proceedings are civil administrative matters not criminal
cases, the driver was not entitled to warnings.
The Callahan-Oliver reasoning is questionable at best. Neither
case analyzed whether Miranda should apply to drunk driving arrests
and were merely content to cite other cases holding it does not. The
rationale that there is a distinction between criminal drunk driving pro-
ceedings and civil license suspensions has been heavily criticized by one
tioning a driver, but claimed this was not communicated. Examining whether this con-
stituted custody, the court originally decided the definition's second part referred to
"situations of greater deprival of freedom of action than the ordinary stop of a car ...,
but short of formal arrest." Id. at 1109.Custody did not exist since the officer never
mentioned his intentions. Justice Linde, dissenting, argued one of the majority opinion's
dangers is potential misapplication in all drunk driving cases. "[I]t may be thought to
stand for proposition that the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicants some-
how is sui generis as far as Miranda warnings before questioning are concerned." Id.
at 1125.
On rehearing, the court decided custody existed when the officer formed the intent
to arrest. Roberti, 646 P.2d 1341 (1982), petiton for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3208
(U.S. Sept. 28, 1982) (No. 82-315).
230. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), defined this as "not only...
express questioning; but also . . . any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301.
231. 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
232. 47 Fla. Supp. 111 (Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, 1977).
233. Id. at 114 (Palm Beach County Court 1976).
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recent federal court considering a "right to counsel" issue.23 4 Since
these two cases summarily discuss Miranda's application a brief look at
other jurisdictions is needed.
State courts are split on this issue. 3 5 Among courts finding warn-
ings unnecessary New Jersey's seem typical. State v. Macuk,2 31 cited
by Callahan, found Miranda inapplicable to drunk driving arrest for
four reasons, all debatable. 37 Macuk noted Miranda and succeeding
Supreme Court cases construing it all involve serious offenses. Thus
until the Supreme Court acts otherwise, Macuk would limit its scope.
This "petty offense" reasoning is wrong. There is no indication Mi-
randa was intended to apply only to felonies. Indeed the opinion's lan-
guage indicates otherwise.2 38 Likewise subsequent decisions reject the
petty offense argument for sixth amendment purposes. Where incarcer-
ation results the Supreme Court has held the "right to counsel"
applies.2 9
Secondly, Macuk felt Miranda was limited to stationhouse ques-
tioning designed to "sweat out" a confession. This reasoning misreads
Miranda in two respects. Miranda was concerned with such cases but
234. Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982). As Heles notes, a drunk
driving arrest may result in criminal charges even though chemical testing is refused.
The option is not the driver's but the state's. See also infra, text accompanying notes
248-57 for further criticism of this distinction.
235. See State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980); State v. Lawson, 285
N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1974); Commonwealth v. Bonser, 258 A.2d 675 (Pa.
1969), holding Miranda applicable Contra, City of Columbus v. Hayes, 9 Ohio App.
2d 38, 222 N.E. 829 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 941 (1967); State v. Bliss, 238
A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972).
236. 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970).
237. See Comment, Miranda and Misdemeanors, 14 LAND & WATER L. REV.
521 (1979) heavily criticizing Macuk's rationale.
238. If the Court wished to draw a felony-misdemeanor distinction, it could eas-
ily have done so. The Court aimed at protecting a person's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, whenever the need arose: "[T]here can be no doubt that the
fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and
serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way. . ." 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). This also refutes the Cal-
lahan criminal offense vs. civil administrative proceedinns distinction.
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not limited to them. The Court has indicated Miranda applies when
custodial interrogation takes place outside a police station. 240
Thirdly, the court in Macuk felt drunk driving offenses did not
merit the extra time needed to inform drivers of their rights. This is a
re-hash of the "petty offense" argument. The time consumed in reading
a suspect the warnings is short, and many police departments have pro-
vided standard Miranda warnings cards to use.
Fourth, since New Jersey arrested many drivers yearly for
drunken driving, to provide lawyers for all who might request them
pursuant to Miranda would be too troublesome. This argument has
been effectively eliminated in states adopting state-wide public de-
fender systems, like Florida. The real reason for this argument is fear
drivers would invoke the right to silence after being warned, thus mak-
ing cesation of questioning mandatory.241
Whether many drivers would invoke Miranda to remain silent and
demand counsel after a drunk driving arrest is debatable.24 2 At any
rate, this argument misses the main issue. If Miranda warnings must
be given, drivers are within their rights to remain silent notwithstand-
ing any inconvenience this causes police.
Unfortunately the United States Supreme Court has declined all
opportunities to decide this issue.24 3 More recent state cases have ap-
plied Miranda to the drunk driving situation. 4 State v. Fields,245
240. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) finding Miranda applicable to
in-custody questioning in a defendant's bedroom.
241. See also State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d at 850 (citing large number of yearly
drunk driving arrests as "practical reason why motor vehicle offenses should be treated
somewhat differently ... than most other offenses").
242. See Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519 (1967), concluding that for only eight of eighty-one suspects whose
interrogations were observed did Miranda have any effect; Seeburger & Wettick, Mi-
randa in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 PITm. L. REV. 1 (1967) concluded Mi-
randa had no appreciable effect on crime clearance rates.
243. In State v. Lewin, 163 N.J. Super. 439, 395 A.2d 211 (1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 905 (1979), Justices Brennan, White and Stewart noted the split among state
courts and dissented from denial of certiorari.
244. Even states admitting refusals of testing have applied Miranda to drunk
driving situations. See Commonwealth v. Bonser, 258 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1969); Campbell
v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 685 (Ariz. 1971).
245. 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980). See also Note, Criminal Law - Accusatory
State of Proceedings - Custody Test Requires Miranda Warnings After DWI Arrest,
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found Miranda inapplicable to preliminary questions used to determine
whether a person had been driving a wrecked vehicle. However, once
the driver was arrested, Miranda protections were needed. Fields rec-
ognized a driver arrested for drunk driving is within custody and ques-
tioning him is interrogation. The court recognized a drunk driving ar-
rest's implications and refused to consider it a mere traffic offense.
Florida clearly considers drunken driving a serious offense. Only a
brief look at Florida Statutes Section 316.193246 is needed to demon-
strate this. Moreover, considering drunken driving a minor violation
forces police to unnecessarily distinguish instances where the offense is
punishable by less than six months imprisonment and when it may re-
sult in manslaughter charges. The Florida Supreme Court has never
considered whether Miranda applies to drunken driving offense arrests.
When the time comes, it should follow the recent trend and apply Mi-
randa in this context.
C. Right to Counsel and Chemical Intoxication Testing
In Schmerber, the Supreme Court held admitting results of a
blood test, taken over the driver's objections based on incorrect advice
of counsel,2 47 did not violate the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Close reading shows the decision is not persuasive authority against a
right to counsel claim. The driver was afforded the chance to contact
his attorney. The right to counsel claim did not involve an access ques-
tion but merely whether the attorney's advice was correct - a question
the Court resolved in its fifth amendment discussion.
When Schmerber was tested, California had no Implied Consent
law. Afterwards nearly every state passed one. Case law considering
whether an arrested driver has a right to counsel unfortunately focuses
on different standards. Most decisions discuss the difference between
criminal proceedings under a state's drunk driving laws and civil li-
cense suspension proceedings under a state's implied consent law.
Others consider whether the decision to submit to chemical testing is a
"critical stage" requiring counsel. Additionally, a few states distinguish
57 N.D.L. REV. 673 (1981).
246. FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (Supp. 1982).
247. The attorney incorrectly advised Schmerber the blood sample was prohib-
ited by the privilege aginst self-incrimination.
229 1Drunk Driving Laws
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between a right to consult counsel versus the right to have counsel pre-
sent when testing is done.
1. Civil License Suspension versus Criminal Proceedings.
If an arrested driver refuses testing, all states with implied consent
laws provide administrative mechanisms for revocation or suspension of
a driver's license. 48 One recurring question is whether refusal based on
a right to counsel claim constitutes refusal for revocation or suspension
purposes. If a driver refuses, two possibilities arise: criminal prosecu-
tion and license suspension. 49 Several states differentiate between the
nature of these two proceeding as far as the right to counsel.2 50 Those
states holding no right to counsel exists strictly construe the sixth
amendment's language that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right . .. to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.251
These states reason that since license suspensions are not "criminal
prosecutions", no right to counsel is involved. Vermont illustrates the
extremes to which such decisions go. In State v. Dellveneri2 52 the Ver-
mont Supreme Court, based upon the summary nature of the implied
consent law's administrative suspension hearing, a civil proceeding, de-
cided that a driver was not required to be informed of a right to coun-
sel before deciding to take breathalyzer tests. However, when the pro-
ceedings became criminal the same court surprisingly found such a
248. See Florida Statutes section 316.1932(1)(d)(g) (Supp. 1982) for a descrip-
tion of Florida suspension procedures.
249. Indeed until testing is refused, only criminal prosecution is possible since
there would be no basis for civil license suspension. When strong evidence exists, even
absent test results, prosecution is a distinct possibility. See Prideaux v. State Dept. of
Public Safety, 310 Minn. 176, -, 247 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1976).
250. See Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1979) ("well
established ... that proceedings involving the suspension or revocation of a license
• ..are civil, not criminal in nature"); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 298 (N.D.
1974) ("proceedings under the Implied Consent Law are civil in nature"); Gottschalk
v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 1179, 140 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1966) ("Neither [federal or
state constitution giving Right to Counsel] is applicable to this administrative
proceeding. .. ").
251. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
252. 128 Vt. 84, 258 A.2d 834 (1969).
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right. State v. Welch 253 held an accused's right to counsel was violated
when police officers convinced a driver to submit to a breath test after
he requested counsel. Dellveneri was discussed, but summarily distin-
guished based on the criminal nature of the proceedings in Welch.
This stretches the right to counsel issue to an extreme. Theoreti-
cally, under Vermont law, if the driver had continued to refuse testing
and not been afforded a chance to consult counsel, the refusal could not
have been admissible in a criminal trial since his 'sixth amendment
rights were violated. However, if a civil license suspension proceeding
was brought, the refusal could be admitted since the nature of those
proceedings recognize no such right.
Fortunately several courts refuse to draw such illogical distinctions
between the two proceedings. 54 Such courts recognize the dual pos-
sibilities an arrest for drunk driving has and adopt a more realistic
view. Heles v. South Dakota,25 5 the only federal court decision, re-
cently declared
In effect the threat of a license revocation (the civil proceeding) is
a tool employed at the time of arrest to gather evidence against the
driver to utilize in a later criminal prosecution.*** To say that the
person does not have a right to contact an attorney prior to decid-
ing whether to take the sobriety test, because the license revocation
proceeding, initiated once the test is refused, is civil in nature to-
tally ignores the fact that the person is in custody pursuant to an
arrest on a criminal charge. The proceedings are all criminal in
nature until testing is actually refused. 256
Heles correctly notes that drunk driving arrests have all the char-
acteristics of any other criminal apprehension. The driver is formally
placed under arrest, often given Miranda warnings, and most likely
taken to jail for temporary detention. The only unusual aspect is the
253. 135 Vt. 312, 376 A.2d 351 (Vt. 1977).
254. See Prideaux, 310 Minn. 176, 247 N.W.2d 385; Leopold v. Tofany, 68
Misc. 2d 3, 325 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), affd mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 550,
327 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1971).
255. 530 F. Supp. 646. (D.S.D. 1982).
256. Id. at 651-52 (footnotes omited). Recently, the Eighth Circuit declared
Heles moot, since the driver had died when the district court rendered its decision. The
case was remanded with directions to vacate.
231117:1983
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possibility of license suspension if refusal occurs. Especially significant
are the Miranda warnings which include notification of a right to coun-
sel during questioning. Given these, drivers may easily be misled into
believing a right to counsel exists and should not be expected to draw a
fine civil versus criminal distinction.257
2. Critical Stage Analysis
States refusing to use the fictitious civil-criminal distinction focus
on the situation when an accused is asked to undergo testing - not the
nature of any later proceeding. The right to counsel guaranteed in all
criminal prosecutions has been extended well beyond the mere right to
representation at trial. Any criminal proceeding whose nature makes it
a "critical stage", is one where an accused is entitled to counsel.25 8
Courts have considered whether the decision to undergo chemical in-
toxication testing amounts to a critical stage under two bases: (1)
whether the testing procedure itself amounts to a critical stage, (2)
whether state court rule or statute makes testing a critical stage.
Most courts find that the nature of the testing process itself is not
a "critical stage," where counsel is necessary. United States v. Wade259
considered whether any pre-trial proceeding is a "critical stage" by ex-
amining "whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve
the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right mean-
ingfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effec-
tive assistance of counsel at the trial itself. 2 60
Wade considered a post-indictment lineup where the accused is
confronted with possible eyewitnesses a critical stage since a lineup was
inherently suggestive and seldom could be accurately reconstructed at
trial. However Wade indicted that where a scientific process, like blood
testing, is used to gather and evaluate evidence pre-trial, no such criti-
257. See also State Dept. of Highways v. Beckey, 192 N.W.2d 441, 192 N.W.2d
444 (Minn. 1971) (confusion generated by Miranda warnings is a reasonable ground to
refuse test).
258. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), preliminary hearing where
witnesses testify is a critical stage where counsel needed; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961), arraignment where defenses must be asserted or lost requires cousel.
259. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
260. Id. at 227.
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cal stage exists.
"[K] nowledge of the techniques of science and technology is suffi-
ciently available . ., that the accused has the opportunity for a mean-
ingful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the ordi-
nary processes of cross-examination of the Government's expert
witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own ex-
perts." 261Virtually all courts concluding chemical blood testing is not a
"critical stage" rely on this language. The sole exception is State v.
Fitzsimmons,262 where the Washington Supreme court decided the
right to counsel should apply to breathalyzer testing. Fitzsimmons
termed drunk driving a unique charge. Since physical evidence would
soon disappear, arrangements must be made for immediate supplemen-
tal testing and disinterested witnesses found. In this second respect,
Fitzsimmons was misguided. Presenting disinterested witnesses is not
peculiar to drunk driving but applies to any criminal charge. Some
time will necessarily have passed before counsel can be contacted and
arrive. Any witnesses will likely be gone. Counsel arguably will be able
to use witnesses listed on an officer's accident report-something which
can be obtained long afterwards.
Several states have decided that under their state laws or court
rules, the right to counsel attaches to the decision whether to undergo
testing. Some states explicitly guarantee such right,26 3 while others im-
ply it from the decision an accused must make. Decisions finding no
statutorily created right to counsel reason that since the arrested driver
does not have a right under the Implied Consent law to refuse testing,
counsel's advice is not required, even though the driver retains the
261. Id. at 227-28.
262. 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980), cert. granted, vacated and re-
manded, 449 U.S. 977 (1980). The Court, remanded for consideration whether the
judgment was based upon state or federal constitutional grounds or both. Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart, Marshall and Stevens dissented. On remand, the Washington Supreme
Court held its decision rested primarily on a state court rule, but declared its previous
constitutional discussion "helps demonstrate the application and effect of the court
rules". 620 P.2d 999, 1000 (Wash. 1980).
263. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4) (Supp. 1981) which provides:
"That he has the right to call an attorney and select a witness to view for him the
testing procedures; but that the test shall not be delayed for this purpose for a period in
excess of 30 minutes from the time he is notified of his rights."
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power to refuse.2 6
4
Prideaux v. State Department of Public Safety,26 5 the leading
case to the contrary, relied on a state statute guaranteeing arrested per-
sons the right to consult counsel as soon practicable.2 "6 The court ex-
amined the possible choices facing an arrested driver and penalties
which may arise therefrom. Since Minnesota law gave drivers the
power to choose between submitting or not, the driver's decision was
considered important enough to afford counsel. Likewise Heles v.
South Dakota26 focused partially on state law to find counsel should
be afforded. "The fact that by statute, South Dakota allows the ar-
rested driver to refuse to take the test, brings into play important legal
considerations. ' 26 8 Since state law created such a choice, it would be
unfair to deny the advice of counsel in making the choice.2 69
3. Nature of the Right to Counsel
Once courts find a right to counsel exists when a person is re-
quested to undergo blood content analysis, the extent of that right must
be determined. Even if the right exists, only one court requires that an
arrested driver be explicitly informed. Most decisions discuss what
should happen when the driver requests counsel. In this regard the
264. See Campbell v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 685, 693 (Ariz. 1971) ("person
does not have a right to refuse . . . only the physical power; therefore. . . there is no
issue of counsel's ability to assist"); See also Dunn v. Petit, 388 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1978).
265. 247 N.W. 2d 385.
266. See MIN. STAT. § 481.10 (1971).
267. 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982).
268. Id. at 652.
269. See also Fuller v. State Dept. of Transp., 275 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1979),
state statutorily required to honor arrested driver's request to consult counsel before
deciding to take chemical test; Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App. 1975),
court rule requires person held in custody opportunity to consult counsel; McNulty v.
Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 328 N.E.2d 798 (1975), state statutes allows communica-
tion with attorney following arrest or detention; Comment, The Right to Counsel
Under Oregon's Implied Consent Law, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 236 (1974) arguing that
Oregon law requires the right to consult counsel before deciding to submit to chemical
testing; Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel. The Case Against
Implied Consent, 58 TEX. L. REV. 935 (1980), arguing that even if counsel is not
constitutionally required, states should legislatively provide for such.
270. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d 385.
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courts are almost uniform in finding a limited right. Only reasonable
opportunity to consult counsel is needed, such as a phone call. Any-
thing more would seem to jeopardize the opportunity to gather evi-
dence, since alcohol metabolizes in the body rapidly.
State v. Fitzsimmons71 is the only case requiring more. Most
cases arise when a driver wishes to call an attorney. What happens
when the driver claims indigency and requests counsel? Fitzsimmons
requires that counsel be afforded under the circumstances. While this
appears to present police officers with an unsurmountable obstacle, es-
pecially since many drunk driving arrests occur late at night, Fitzsim-
mons suggests that reasonable methods, such as having police carry
lists of volunteer attorneys, could be utilized. Fitzsimmons rejected the
state's argument that this would present problems because counsel
would always want to be present at testing, since telephone consulta-
tions might often be sufficient. The suggestion is curious as the court
had found the decision to submit to testing a critical stage where coun-
sel is needed to find possible defense witnesses. No attempt was made
to reconcile these apparent conflicts. Likewise, the court did not con-
sider what happens when a telephone call alone would not suffice.
4. Right to Counsel in Florida
Florida courts have not acted favorably on right to counsel claims.
In the earliest case, State v. Wilson, 2 an arrested driver claimed his
sixth amendment rights were denied when police refused to delay
breathalyzer testing until his attorney arrived. Wilson had been af-
forded the opportunity to consult counsel but still refused testing when
his attorney had not arrived after an hour and fifteen minutes. Rather
than deciding the issue on the narrow basis that Wilson had been af-
forded all that was constitutionally required-a reasonable opportunity
to consult counsel rather than actually having an attorney present-the
court focused on the civil nature of the proceedings under the Implied
Consent Law, rather than a criminal prosecution. Thus Wilson fol-
lowed those cases finding license suspensions not a "criminal prosecu-
tion" under the sixth amendment.
271. 610 P.2d 893.
272. 34 Fla. Supp. 141 (Circuit Court of Fifteenth Judicial Circuit 1970).
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Subsequently, State v. Oliver, 17 again raised the right to counsel
question in connection with breath testing. There an arrested driver,
given Miranda warnings and advised of the consequences for refusing
the breathalyzer, requested an opportunity to contact counsel. In-
formed that an attorney's presence was not needed to administer the
test, Oliver's repeated requests ended with the arresting officer certify-
ing his refusal to submit. Relying on Wilson, the Circuit Court re-
versed a county court ruling that Oliver was entitled to consult counsel
before taking the test. The court first decided that any proceedings re-
sulting from refusal to cooperate with the police would be civil, under
the Implied Consent Law, rather than criminal. Additionally, the court
noted that County of Dade v. Callahan274 had declared this a petty
offense not needing Miranda warnings and State v. Webb27 5 had held
there was no right to counsel in petty offense cases summarily triable
and punishable by less than six months imprisonment. Thus Oliver de-
clared the right to counsel did not apply.
Unfortunately, no Florida Supreme Court or District Court of Ap-
peal cases have addressed the right to counsel issue in the context of
blood alcohol testing. Recent developments show State v. Oliver is erro-
neous law. First, Oliver's reasoning is clearly questionable. Oliver failed
to distinguish between the different provisions the drivers were charged
with violating. In Callahan the offense charged was violation of a mu-
nicipal ordinance rather than a state-wide statute as in Oliver. Sec-
ondly, State v. Webb upon which Oliver heavily relied, is also question-
able. Webb declared that offenders accused of petty traffic offenses are
not entitled to a jury trial. Webb did not, as Oliver says, discuss the
sixth amendment right to counsel in such proceedings. Indeed had
Webb done so, the decision would be wrong.276 Why Oliver failed to
273. 47 Fla. Supp. 3 (Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, 1977).
274. 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
275. 335 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1976).
276. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court rejected the petty
offense-serious crime argument for right to counsel purposes twice, first noting "the
right to trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded with a system of trial to
a judge alone." Id. at 29. and secondly, forcefully declaring the distinction between the
two. "While there is historical support for limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by
jury to 'serious criminal cases' there is no such support for a similar limitation on the
right to assistance of counsel . . ." Id. at 30.
1236 Nova Law Journal 7: 1983 1
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note this is unexplainable 7 7 and shows its error. Thirdly, Oliver did not
distinguish between the types of offenses before it and the Webb court.
Webb did not deal with a drunk driving offense but with driving with-
out a valid inspection sticker and with an expired driver's license. Fi-
nally, statutory changes raise further questions about the continued vi-
tality of the Webb-Callahan cases. Today, defendants can have jury
trials in any "drunk driving" case.278 This effectively does away with
the Oliver-Callahan rationale that these can be summary proceedings.
Moreover, Oliver never considered whether the same rationale would
apply if the charge had been D.W.I. manslaughter--certainly not sum-
marily triable and clearly not a petty offense.
At least two subsequent county court cases have not followed Oli-
ver. In State v. Roche279 denial of a request to consult counsel before
deciding to submit to a breath test caused reversal over the state's
claim that this was a refusal. The Orange County Court agreed there is
no sixth amendment right to counsel before deciding to take a breath
test.280 Thus police were not required to inform a driver of such. How-
ever, when drivers request the chance to consult counsel, the court us-
ing a due process analysis found that a reasonable opportunity to do so
was required. On appeal, merely stating its agreement with courts find-
ing no limited right to consult counsel, the Circuit Court proceeded to
do a brief Wade "critical stage" analysis.28 1 However, the County
Court never relied on this, but rather chose a due process approach.
Misunderstanding and mixing the two grounds, the Circuit Court re-
277. Oliver is the only decision relying on a petty offense - felony distinction to
find there is no right to consult counsel. Following Argersinger, Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979), held the right to counsel exists only wherever imprisonment is actu-
ally imposed. For a critical review of Scott, see Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois
and the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
71 (1979).
278. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(5). Caverly v. State, 8 Fla. L.W. 1364 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1983) reversed a driving under the influence conviction where a
jury trial request was denied.
279. (No. T080-53470; Orange County; Dec. 19, 1980).
280. The court accepted Wilson's civil administrative proceeding vs. criminal
prosecution analysis. Thus Roche never undertook the next level of sixth amendment
analysis, whether a chemical test for intoxication amounted to a "critical stage" under
Wade.
281. (Orange County Circuit Court; AP8I-11; Dec. 23, 1981).
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versed the lower court's decision.
State v. Formato,28 2 without discussing Oliver, found that by pass-
ing Florida Statutes section 901.2483 which states: "A person arrested
shall be allowed to consult with any attorney entitled to practice in this
state, alone and in private at the place of custody as often and for such
periods of time as is reasonable" 284 the legislature made arrest a criti-
cal stage where the opportunity to consult counsel is required. Thus
BAT Mobile videotapes taken after a refusal to let the driver call an
attorney were inadmissible. If Formato's analysis based upon Florida
Statutes section 901.24 is correct, Florida has joined states creating a
statutory right to consult counsel before submitting to breath testing.
Unfortunately, the case law on this point seems split as Oliver earlier
had reversed, without discussion, the County Court's partial reliance on
section 901.24 to find a right to counsel. Likewise, the Circuit Court in
Roche rejected a section 901.24 claim. Doing so, it examined section
901.24 in conjunction with the valid excuses for refusal of testing under
the Implied Consent Law. Since the law did not specifically mention
whether a driver was afforded the right to counsel as an issue in a
suspension hearing, the Circuit Court reasoned that the legislature by
passing secton 901.24 did not intend to amend the Implied Consent
Law. 285
Even without section 90.124 a right to counsel argument can still
be made. As noted above, under the Implied Consent Law, Florida
drivers retain the power to refuse breath testing. When testing has been
previously done over such refusal, the courts consistently declared the
282. (Broward County Court; No. 80-37621TT40; June 10, 1981).
283. FLA. STAT. § 901.24 (1981).
284. Id.
285. Roche was decided under the former Implied Consent Law. The law's new
version likewise does not indicate legislative intent to make section 901.24 valid
grounds for refusing testing.
In State v. Burts, 24 Fla. Supp. 88 (Dade County Circuit Court 1964), counsel
appeared and advised police he would not permit any chemical testing. When this was
done anyways, the Circuit Court suppressed results. Burts is irrelevant to a section
901.24 right to counsel argument. At the time Florida had no Implied Consent Law
giving drivers the option of testing or suspension upon refusal. Schmerber v. California
subsequently established the driver had no fifth amendment right to refuse testing.
Thus the results taken over the refusal should have been admitted since neither consti-
tutional grounds nor state law prohibited such.
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results inadmissible. While Florida Statutes section 316.1933288 modi-
fies former case law in limited circumstances with respect to blood test-
ing, most forced testing is still invalid. Given this recognized power to
refuse testing, a Heles - Prideaux rationale could be adopted to find
that a right to counsel exists. Besides obtaining witnesses' names, coun-
sel could play an important role in advising a driver whether to submit.
If death or serious bodily injury has occurred, convictions may be diffi-
cult to obtain without chemical test results. In such instances, counsel
will often advise refusal. Alternatively, if counsel advises submission,
the driver may request additional testing to ensure the accuracy of test
results281 or additional breath or blood samples. 88 Whatever the ulti-
mate result, one thing is clear. Most decisions finding no right to con-
sult counsel have relied on wrong analysis. Thus the right to counsel
issue is still unsettled in Florida.
V. CONCLUSION
The new "drunk driving" law makes substantial changes in prior Flor-
ida statutes and case law. Like any new law, only experience can estab-
lish how effective the changes are. Given the media attention, it should
have at least beneficial short term results .28 However, as pointed out,
286. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (Supp. 1982).
287. If optional testing is not afforded, suppression of other test results occurs.
City of Jasper v. Cromer, 32 Fla. Supp. 107 (Hamilton County Circuit Court 1969)
reversed a defendant's convicton where police refused a driver's reasonable request for
optional testing. The Implied Consent law does not require police to inform drivers of
any right to additional testing. Additional testing may be necessary to ensure the
proper interpretation of the first test's results. See Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 200,
disputing the validity of convictions when only one test is administered.
288. Florida law does not require police to obtain or preserve breath or blood
samples for later defense testing. See State v. Cooper, 391 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), no due process violation when blood sample lost since evidence concededly
favorable to defense; State v. Phillipe, 402 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981),
failure to preserve test ampoules is a matter for Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles rather than courts. State v. Lee, 422 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (no due process violation in state's failure to retain sample of driver's breath).
See also Thornton, Uses and Abuses of Forensic Science, 69 A.B.A.J. 289, 292
(March 1983), for criticism from a forensic scientist's viewpoint of those jurisdiction
requiring retention of Breathalyzer test amopules for independent testing.
289. After six months' operation under the new law, traffic fatalities were down
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serious deficiencies remain. The following changes should be made dur-
ing the next legislative session:
(1) Repeal § 316.1933 allowing forcible blood sampling, or at least
restrict such when it would be medically dangerous;
(2) Provide specific authorization for the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services, or another appropriate state agency, to
adopt statewide testing procedures for urinalysis;
(3) Amend § 316.1932(1)(c) to require police officers to notify
drivers that refusal of a test will result in admission of the refusal
in any trial, along with license suspension;
(4) Amend § 316.1932(1)(h) to require law enforcement personnel
to notify drivers of the right to optional testing;
(5) Amend the law to require law enforcement personnel to obtain
additional samples of blood, breath or urine for later testing within
a reasonable time, e.g., thirty days, by defendant drivers.
Given passage of any, and hopefully all, of these recommenda-
tions,2 °0 Florida's drunk driving law will be a more effective and fairer
12% compared to 1981. See New law cited as fatalities decrease, Fort Lauderdale
News, Jan. 1, 1983, at IB, col. 5.
290. During the 1983 legislative session, there were thirteen bills introduced to
amend the "drunk driving" laws. Only one bill, H.B. 809, 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 83-187,
which amends Fla Stat. §§ 316.193(1) (Supp. 1982) and 316.1931(1) (Supp. 1982) by
replacing the words "model glue" with "chemical substances set forth in 877.11,"
passed. This broadens the category of chemicals, other than alcohol or controlled sub-
stances, it would be illegal to drive under the influence of. See supra text accompany-
ing n. 10-14 for description of how these sections presently read.
A brief description of the twelve bills not passing follows below:
(1) S.B. 69 would have given under Fla. Stat. § 316.1931 (Supp. 1982) the De-
partment of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles authority to revoke the license of any
driver involved in an accident causing property damage or personal injury while driving
under the influence even if the trial court withheld adjudication. The revocation period
runs from the date of offense rather than the date adjudication is withheld, thus still
making it possible for court delays to shorten the intended revocation time.
(2) H.B. 36 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.1931 (Supp. 1982) to provide
a minimum one year sentence for drivers conficted of manslaughter. This sentence
could not be withheld nor could a driver be paroled before serving the minimum one
year's time.
(3) H.B. 1202 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193(4) (Supp. 1982) to re-
quire first offenders to be placed on probation for up to one year.
(4) S.B. 962 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193 (Supp. 1982) to require
I
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means of eliminating drunk drivers from the roadways.
any driver convicted of driving under the influence or with unlawful blood alcohol level
to pay an additional $10.00 fine into the prosecuting county's fine and forfeiture fund.
(5) S.B. 179 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193(4)(a) (Supp. 1982) to
require a minimum seven days incarceration for convicted drivers who refuse to do the
"public service or community work project" required of first offenders.
(6) H.B. 942 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193(4)(a) (Supp. 1982) to
forbid remuneration for any required public service. However the bill also would create
Fla. Stat. § 316.1936 making any person doing mandatory "public service" a state
employee for Workmen's Compensation purposes.
(7) H.B. 474 required a Victim Impact Statement for sentencing use, whenever
death or serious bodily injury occurs to someone else because of an offender's driving
under the influence.
(8) H.B. 551 would have repealed the statutory right to jury trial under Fla.
Stat. § 316.1934(4) (Supp. 1982).
(9) S.B. 246 would have increased the license suspension period for refusing a
blood alcohol test from three to six months for a first refusal and from six months to
one year for subsequent refusals.
(10) S.B. 224 would have required alcohol abuse education for anyone convicted
of being a "disorderly or dangerous alcohol offender" under a newly created Fla. Stat.
§ 856.012.
(11) H.B. 550 would have provided additional sentencing alternatives for minors
convicted of driving intoxicated or under the influence.
(12) S.B. 852 would have created new provisions suspending for specified time
periods the registration of any vehicle whose owner drives during a license suspension
due to drunk driving violations.
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